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"For the Constitution to have vitality," wrote Chief Justice Earl
Warren in 1965, "this Court must be able to apply its principles to situ-
ations that may not have been foreseen at the time those principles
were adopted."' While the drafters of the sixth amendment to the Con-
stitution were well grounded in the "experience of evils"' 2 that could
afflict a hapless defendant in a criminal case, they could not, Warren
said, predict that the future would bring the invention of a totally new
kind of evil: television. The Chief Justice therefore concurred in the
judgment of four fellow Justices3 and made the adjustment he believed
was demanded by subsequent history: he declared that the trial court
violated Billy Sol Estes's right to due process of law when it permitted
television cameras in the courtroom. 4
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1. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 564 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
2. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). For a discussion of the
"experience of evils" that the sixth amendment and other initial amendments were designed to
prevent, see generally Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960).
3. Justices Clark, Warren, Douglas, Goldberg, and Harlan combined to form the majority
in Estes.
4. The broadcast coverage of Estes's trial was limited. Covered in full were pretrial motions
by the defense for the exclusion of cameras and recording equipment and for a continuance. 381
U.S. at 535-36. During the trial, the court permitted camera crews to make live broadcasts of the
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The Supreme Court in Estes v. Texas concerned itself with pre-
serving the core values of the sixth amendment against erosion in the
face of radical change. Unfortunately, the principle enunciated by
Chief Justice Warren was not applied as carefully to the other constitu-
tional provision implicated in that decision: the first amendment.5
Change has similarly altered the world from the perspective of the free
speech and press clauses, and the question left unanswered in Estes was
how the core values of the first amendment might be adequately safe-
guarded when garbed in forms the founders could not have foreseen.
The Supreme Court in recent decades has intoned repeatedly that
the first amendment vigorously protects free speech and press in all its
Protean modem guises.6 The actual holdings of its cases, however,
suggest that in communications media, the printing press is first among
equals. Legislators and government administrators have, with Court
approval, exerted controls over the content and operations of the
broadcast media that would be unthinkable if applied to the print me-
dia.7 The majority in Estes, for example, suggested that the govern-
ment may open a governmental event to reporters with notebooks but
close it to the technological tools of radio and television.8 A series of
contrasting cases after Estes reinforced this double standard. In Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC9 the Supreme Court sanctioned major
governmental intrusions into editorial control of the content of radio
state's opening and closing arguments, although mechanical difficulties blanked out the visual part
of the broadcast of the opening, and of the return of the verdict. The court did not permit cover-
age of defense summations. During the trial, videotapes but no sound recordings were permitted.
Id. at 537 & n.2.
5. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
6. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975); Superior
Films, Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495 (1952); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). Justice Douglas
expressed the Court's overall attitude toward the diverse modes of modern communications in
Superior Films, 346 U.S. at 589, as follows: "Motion pictures are of course a different medium of
expression than the public speech, the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First
Amendment draws no distinction between the various methods of communicating ideas."
7. The differences in the treatment of print versus broadcast media have occasioned much
comment over the years. For a sampling of writings on one or more aspects of broadcast regula-
tion which attempt to explore those differences, see, e.g., B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS V.
PUBLIC ACCESS (1976); Bollinger, Freedom ofthe Press and Public Access." Toward a Theory of
Partial Regulation ofthe Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1976); Kalven, Broadcasting, Public
Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J. LAW & ECON. 15 (1967); Robinson, The FCC and the First
Amendment: Observations on 40years ofRadio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67
(1967).
8. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
9. 385 U.S. 367 (1969). But cf. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(refusing to extend the fairness doctrine, see note 11 infra, to commercial advertising on matters of
public interest).
[Vol. 1980:641
Vol. 1980:6411 OVERCOMING FUTURE SHOCK
and television programming. The Court upheld a federal law mandat-
ing equal time for political candidates' ° and approved the Federal
Communications Commission's fairness doctrine" and limited right of
public access to privately held broadcast facilities to reply to personal
attacks.' 2 When a similar right of reply theory was pursued against a
newspaper in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,13 however, the
Court rejected the claim. More recently, in a case involving the radio
broadcast of George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue, FCC v.
Paciftca Foundation,t4 the Court approved Federal Communications
Commission regulation of speech deemed to be "indecent." The print
media, as well as other "older" forms of expression such as motion pic-
tures and live theater, enjoy a broader freedom to be indecent; they are
held to the less restrictive limit on free speech marked out by the ob-
scenity standard.' 5
These sorts of contrasts suggest that first amendment law has be-
gun to diverge: restraints that cannot be imposed on the print media
can be imposed on the electronic media. This development holds sig-
nificance for the future of first amendment freedoms. The strict stan-
dards of noninterference that first amendment scholars have assumed
10. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1976).
11. The fairness doctrine is a policy developed by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) requiring that broadcasters adequately cover public issues, and that in doing so they pro-
vide for the expression of opposing views. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 375-80 (1969).
12. The right of public access involved in Red Lion is set out in 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, -.300,
-.598, -.679 (1979). The regulations provide that individuals against whom personal attacks are
made on the air have a right to use the broadcaster's facilities to respond.
13. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
14. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), which prohibits the broadcasting of
"obscene, indecent, or profane language," constitutional as applied to the particular circumstances
of the case).
15. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). But cf. Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (a community may regulate the exhibition of nonobscene adult books and
films by the use of zoning ordinances). The propriety of substantial government regulation of
cable television, the newest mass medium, remains unsettled; the attempts to fit cable within the
regulatory and first amendment framework currently governing broadcasters are unlikely to
abate. The FCC first asserted jurisdiction over cable television in 1965. First Report and Order, I
FCC 2d 453 (1965). Since then, the FCC has supported expansion of 18 U.S.C. § 1464-the crimi-
nal statute which prohibits utterance of "obscene, indecent, or profane language" in broadcast-
ing-to include cable. Note, FCC Regulations of Cable Television Content, 31 RUTGERS L. REV.
238 (1978). The Commission also promulgated regulations requiring larger cable system opera-
tors to set aside channels and facilities for programing by members of the public, the government,
and educators. The Supreme Court invalidated those rules as exceeding the FCC's statutory au-
thority in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). Nevertheless, states and localities
continue to impose access requirements on cable operators under the terms of their franchise
agreements. See M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 519-24, 551-53 (1979); B. SCHMIDT, supra
note 7, at 199-216.
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as the basis of a free press could ultimately decrease in importance by
remaining linked to the printing press, a form of communication that
may well in a few short decades become obsolete.' 6
Yet the divergence of first amendment law into stronger protection
for print media and more modest protection for electronic media seems
almost inadvertent. The courts, the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, and others, in attempting to cope with new technology and with
the astonishing growth in mass communications, have fixed their atten-
tion on the differences between the printed word and the product of
cameras, recording devices, and broadcast equipment; they have failed,
however, to perceive the constitutional common ground that these me-
dia share with the printed word. The development of law for the new
technologies stems from an attempt to deal with the psychological im-
pact of rapid change-Toffierian future shockl 7-rather than a dispas-
sionate attempt to elaborate a first amendment theory that
accommodates "situations that may not have been foreseen at the time
those principles were adopted."' 8
Perhaps this is the right time, historically, to reexamine the devel-
opment of the law and to reconcile the first amendment with the tech-
nology of modem communications. Though the unfamiliarity of
television has worn off, communications experts believe we are on the
verge of another revolution in the way we encode and disseminate in-
formation.' 9 This combination of familiarity and unfamiliarity may
provide both the objectivity and the impetus necessary for a closer ex-
amination of the justification for a two-tier system of first amendment
law.
This Article will consider one small segment of the larger task of
rethinking the application of the first amendment to the multiple voices
of the communications media. The broader subject is the extent of first
amendment protection for the reporter's choice of news-gathering tech-
nology. The immediate focus is the longstanding taboo against the use
of cameras, tape recorders, and television broadcasting equipment in
federal and state courts where reporters are normally welcome to bring
their notebooks. 20
16. For descriptions of how various writers expect communications technology to develop in
the future, including speculation on the reduced importance of print, see J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER,
THE POWER TO INFORM 178-88 (1974); Brown, Cable and Pay TV. on Eve of Technological
Revolution, N.Y. Times, July 31, 1978, § C, at 12, col. 1; Walton, Do You Love Your VDT?,
COLUM. JOURNALIsM REv., July-Aug. 1979, at 36.
17. See A. TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK (1970).
18. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 564 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
19. See note 16 supra.
20. Reporters may be physically barred from the courtroom during certain pretrial proceed-
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One reason to examine the cameras-in-the-courtroom controversy
now is the surprising rapidity with which the taboo is eroding. More
than half the states-virtually all of which prohibited broadcasting or
photography in their courts only five years ago-have either changed
their rules to permit coverage or are actively studying the desirability of
doing so.2 1 Rapid change always inspires reevaluation of the basic
ings, see Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), but Richmond Newsapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980), makes it clear that the press as well as the public has a first amend-
ment right to be present at the actual trial. Nevertheless, Richmond Newspapers left open the
possibility that in some cases the interest in closure may outweigh the press's right to attend a trial.
See 100 S. Ct. at 2830 & n.18. For that reason, this Article considers only the question of media
access to those courts that are open to the general public, as opposed to those courts closed pursu-
ant to a motion like that in Gannett.
21. An accurate list of those states that currently permit the use of television and other re-
cording equipment on a permanent or experimental basis is difficult to compile because the num-
bers are growing steadily, and because many states are moving quickly from experimentation to
permanent amendment of their old prohibitory rules.
At present, the following states have permanently adopted court rules or statutes that permit
the press to cover trials and appellate arguments with electronic and photographic equipment:
Alabama (Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3A(7), (7A), (7B) (effective Feb. 1, 1976),
printedin ALA. CODE tit. 23, at 542); Alaska (Canon 3A(7)(c) (effective Nov. 1, 1979), In re Canon
3A(7), 5 Media L. Rep. 2494 (Alas. 1979)); Colorado (Colorado Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon
3A(8), (9), (10) (adopted Feb. 27, 1956)); Florida (Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7)
(amended May 1, 1979)); Georgia (Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(8) (amended
May 12, 1977), printedin 238 Ga. 855 (1977)); New Hampshire (Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
3A(7) (amended Jan. 1, 1978)); North Dakota (Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (amended
July 1, 1980) (electronic and photographic coverage of appellate proceedings only)); Tennessee
(Supreme Court Rule 43, and Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (amended Feb. 22, 1979));
Texas (Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (adopted Nov. 9, 1976) (electronic record-
ing of appellate arguments only)); Washington (Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (effective
Sept. 20, 1976), printed in 87 Wash. 1119 (1976)); Wisconsin (Code of Judicial Ethics (amended
June 21, 1979)).
In addition, the following states have instituted pilot programs permitting electronic coverage
on a trial basis: Arizona (Order Temporarily Suspending Rule 45, Rules of the Supreme Court,
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (Apr. 16, 1979)); California (In re California Rules of
Court, 6 Media L. Rep. 1252 (Cal. Jud. Council 1980). See also National Center for State Courts,
Electronic and Photographic Media Coverage of Court Proceedings: An Annotated Bibliography
14-15 (Update No. 4, July 1979)); Idaho (Supreme Court Order, In re. Guidelines for Coverage of
Supreme Court Proceedings (Oct. 18, 1978) (arguments before Supreme Court only)); Iowa (In re
Modification of Canon 3A(7) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, 5 Media L. Rep. 2437 (Iowa
(1979)); Louisiana (Supreme Court Order Concerning Television and Court Rules and Regula-
tions for Division B of the Ninth Judicial District Court for Rapides Parish (Feb. 23, 1978));
Minnesota (National Center for State Courts, supra, at 17 (arguments before Supreme Court
only)); Montana (Supreme Court Order, In re Canon 35 of the Montana Canons of Judicial Ethics
(Feb. 3, 1978)); Nevada (In re Rules Setting Forth the Standards of Conduct and Technology
Governing Electronic Media and Still Photo Coverage of Judicial Proceedings, 5 Media L. Rep.
2609 (Nev. Sup. Ct. 1980)); New Jersey (Supreme Court Order Concerning a Trial Program of
Electronic Media Coverage of Court Proceedings (Mar. 15, 1979)); New Mexico (Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (effective July 1, 1980), reported in News Notes, 6 Media L. Rep. No. 4
(May 27, 1980)); Ohio (Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (effective June 1, 1979), printed in
58 Ohio St. xxxi (1979)); Oklahoma (Supreme Court Order, New Rule Change for Code of Judi-
cial Conduct: Canon 3A(7) (Oct. 25, 1978)); Pennsylvania ((effective Oct. 1, 1980), reported in
DUKE LAW JOUAAL
premises on which old rules rested and on which new rules should be
constructed. In this case, one important premise for state courts to re-
consider is the notion that modem technology is not entitled to first
amendment protection when used to gather news about the workings of
the courts. Ultimately, the change in state court practices will return
that question to the United States Supreme Court, giving the Court an
opportunity to review both the validity of its position in Esles and the
first amendment issues it failed to address in that case.22 In the 1980
term, the Court will hear Chandler v. Florida,23 a challenge by two
criminal defendants to Canon 3A(7) of Florida's Code of Judicial
Conduct.24 Under the Florida Canon, the judge permitted newsmen to
televise and photograph the trial of two criminal defendants despite the
defendants' objections. The defendants-appellants argue that the Ca-
non deprived them of their right to due process and a fair trial.
This Article suggests how the Supreme Court might best resolve
the question of cameras in the courts. It proposes a first amendment
analysis that would bring protections for modem communications tech-
nology in line with those protections traditionally accorded the print
media. The proposed theory views a reporter's choice of news-
News Notes, 5 Media L. Rep. No. 32 (Jan. 22, 1980)); West Virginia (Guidelines for Camera
Coverage of Trials in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County (effective Jan. 1, 1979)). Among
states considering such experiments are Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island, National
Center for State Courts, supra, at 14-22, and Maryland, reportedin News Notes, 6 Media L. Rep.
No. 4 (May 27, 1980). The New York Court of Appeals recently conducted a successful test of
televising its own proceedings. N'Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1979, at 1, col. 4. A Media Advisory Committee
appointed by Chief Judge Cooke has recommended that New York permit televising of appellate
proceedings on a permanent basis and experiment for one year in televising civil trials. N.Y.L.J.,
June 4, 1980, at I, col. 3. A New York statute, N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 52 (McKinney 1976),
which prohibits televising proceedings at which witnesses may appear under subpoena, must be
amended before cameras can be used in New York trial courts.
A resolution of the state court chiefjustices recommending that the Code of Judicial Conduct
in each state and federal jurisdiction be amended to permit electronic and photographic coverage
of the courts prompted much of this activity. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution I, adopted
Aug. 2, 1978, reprinted in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 791-92 (Fla.
1979).
22. The Court decided Estes solely on due process grounds.
A case raising issues similar to those in Estes was the 1979 trial in Florida of former law
student Theodore Bundy for the murder of two women students at Florida State University. The
case attracted national attention and the trial was televised over the objections of Bundy, who was
subsequently convicted. People v. Bundy, No. 79-10154 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July 24, 1979), appealdock-
eted, No. 57,772 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 1979); for a description of the case, see N.Y. Times, June
26, 1979, § A, at 14, col. 3; id., July 25, 1979, § A, at 10, col. i.
23. 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), prob. juris noted, I00 S. Ct. 1832 (1980).
24. The Chandler case, Id., actually arose during Florida's experiment with its new Canon.
The new rule was formally adopted in 1979. See In re Post-Newsweek Station, Fla., Inc., 370 So.
2d 764 (Fla. 1979).
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gathering techniques-ranging from memory to written notes or photo-
graphic and aural recording-as presumptively permitted when the
reporter covers a public event, such as a trial.
Part I of the Article argues that all news-gathering techniques
should enjoy a first amendment right of access to any governmental
function otherwise open to the public. This right will be referred to as
"the right of technological access." Given this first amendment right, a
ban on cameras in the courtroom would not be permissible unless clear
and substantial countervailing interests outweighed the reporter's inter-
est in free choice of methods of coverage. Part II examines the public
and constitutional interests that allegedly justify the exclusion of cam-
eras from the courtroom, and concludes that none of these interests
supports the absolute bans that remain in force in a number of jurisdic-
tions. Part III discusses the types of restrictions that may be imposed
upon the use of cameras consistent with the proposed right of access.
The government could impose narrowly drawn limitations on a partic-
ular news-gathering technique when distinctive attributes of the tech-
nique would interfere in a unique and identifiable way with other
constitutional rights, or with significant public interests. The point of
departure for this Article will be a critique of Estes v. Texas,25 the case
that sanctioned the notion that television and the courtroom are per se
incompatible.
A reevaluation of Estes focuses primarily on the cameras-in-the-
courtroom issue, but also carries implications for a broader right of
access to public functions. The same restrictions that have been im-
posed on photographers and broadcasters in open court are also en-
countered at meetings of town councils, 26 in the chambers of legislative
bodies, 27 and in the public activities of administrators and executive
25. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
26. See Nevens v. City of Chino, 233 Cal. App. 2d 775, 44 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App.
1965); Sudol v. Borough of North Arlington, 137 N.J. Super. 149, 348 A.2d 216 (1975); Davidson
v. Common Council of City of White Plains, 40 Misc. 2d 1053, 244 N.Y.S.2d 385 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
All three cases involved efforts to prevent the use of mechanical devices to cover municipal gov-
ernment proceedings.
27. See, e.g., Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Maryland House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 310
A.2d 156 (1973) (the press unsuccessfully challenged a Maryland State Senate rule prohibiting the
use of recording devices and cameras in the chamber without the permission of the President of
the Senate); Comment, The Right to Record and Broadcast Public Legislative Proceedings, 42 U.
CHI. L. REv. 336 (1975). The United States Senate does not permit cameras or recording of its
public sessions except by special permission. Congress permitted debate over ratification of the
Panama Canal Treaty to be broadcast on radio but not on television, S. Res. 268, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S1102 (1978). See generally S. REP. No. 630, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978)
(accompanying S. Res. 268)); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON BROADCASTING AND
THE LEGISLATURE, OPENLY ARRIVED AT 9-10 (1975). The House of Representatives in 1977
passed a resolution under which the House would provide audio and visual coverage of activities
Vol. 1980:641]
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officers of government.28 Many of the justifications these government
bodies give for limiting the news-gathering techniques used to report
their activities are identical to, and were inspired by, the reasoning that
has kept modem communications technology out of the courts. 29
Hence, if the Estes rationale for excluding cameras from the courtroom
falls, the right of technological access will expose other governmental
bodies, as well as the courts, to the eye of the electronic media. Even if
the Supreme Court reaffirms its position in Estes because it believes
that the environment of the courts is particularly sensitive, a clear state-
ment by the justices that the first amendment protects technological ac-
cess would require governmental bodies other than the courts to
reexamine carefully their bans on recording devices.
I. THE CASE FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL ACCESS
A. The Myth of Estes.
The assumptions about the court's power to exclude cameras de-
rive from the broad reading generally given to Estes v. Texas.30 As a
result of that decision, federal and state courts deciding whether to ad-
mit cameras and recording devices to trials and appeals have either
ignored the possiblity of a constitutional question or have asserted that
no right of technological access exists. 3' Estes should not be read so
on the floor of the chamber for use by television, radio, and cable operators. H.R. Res. 866, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H11678 (1977).
28. In 1972, the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended that federal
agencies develop a policy to permit radio and television broadcasters to use recording equipment
to cover administrative proceedings. U.S. ADMIN. CONF., Recommendation 32, [1971-72] REPORT
77-78 (1972), codfled at I C.F.R. § 305.72-1. The response, however, was sparse, U.S. ADMIN.
CONF., [1972-73] REPORT 26-27 (1973). A recent check of the Code of Federal Regulations
reveals little additional activity. See also CBS, Inc. v. Lieberman, 439 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. I11.
1976) (the court refused to enjoin the State Commerce Commission from maintaining an unwrit-
ten rule against recording and filming public agency hearings).
29. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Lieberman, 439 F. Supp. 862, 868 (N.D. I11. 1976), which relies on
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), as precedent and refers to concerns about decorum, disruption
of hearings by the use of recording equipment, the privacy interests of participants, and other
factors comparable to those raised in the courtroom context. See Part II, infra. See also 123
CONG. REC. HI 1687 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Ryan) ("We are now about to change [Congress]
from a forum to a theater"); JOINT COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS, 93D CONO. 2D
SFSS., CONGRESS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 44 (Comm.
Print 1974) (noting the concern over the distortion of the legislative process, the inability of view-
ers to interpret events that are broadcast, and the fear that legislators will "play" to cameras);
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 21-25 (dissent by William A. Rusher)
(television diminishes the importance of complex events rather than informing about them, and
will therefore reduce public respect for the Congress).
30. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
31. See Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1967); In re Acuff, 331 F.
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broadly. There is no clear reason to believe that Estes, whatever it may
have said about television or radio, denied constitutional protection to
the use of still cameras or tape recorders.32 Even less reason exists to
conclude that Estes pronounced a general rule about the permissible
regulation of the newer media in settings other than the courtroom.
It is not even clear what Estes actually held about the use of
broadcasting equipment in the courts. The sole question presented was
whether Billy Sol Estes had been deprived of due process by the cover-
age of his pretrial hearing and trial by broadcasters. 33 Here the major-
ity split. Justice Harlan took a narrower approach than his four
brethren, holding only that the presence of television cameras per se
violates due process in a "criminal trial of great notoriety. ' 34 The
others decided, more expansively, that televising any criminal case vio-
lates the constitutional rights of defendants.
Since Estes concerned the defendant's rights, and not those of the
press, no first amendment claim was before the Court.35 The discussion
of technological access in the opinion 36 is therefore pure dictum. Fur-
thermore, the majority opinion and Chief Justice Warren's concurrence
in Estes may not have intended to suggest that the Constitution guaran-
tees the media no more than to have reporters physically present at the
trial.
The opinion of the Court did state that "courts [cannot] be said to
discriminate where they permit the newspaper reporter access to the
courtroom. The television and radio reporter has the same privilege.
All are entitled to the same rights as the general public. The news
Supp. 819, 820 (D. N. Mex. 1971); In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 774
(Fla. 1979) (all relying on Estes). Most of the recent court orders adopting temporary or perma-
nent rules of technical access suggest that the rulings are discretionary with the courts and do not
consider the possible first amendment interests. See, e.g., In re Canon 3A(7), 4 Media L. Rep.
2631 (Ohio Apr. 12, 1979); In re Canon 3A(7), 4 Media L. Rep. 1824 (Okla. Oct. 25, 1978). In
announcing that the Georgia Supreme Court would revise its rules to permit photographic and
electronic coverage, Chief Justice Nichols spoke only of a desire "to raise the public's appreciation
for and understanding of our court system" as motivating the change. State of the Judiciary Ad-
dress by Chief Justice Nichols to Georgia General Assembly (Feb. 21, 1977).
32. Accord, Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760, 769 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971) (distinguishing still photography from television). Al-
though still photographers were present at Estes's pretrial hearing and trial, 381 U.S. at 536-37, the
Supreme Court did not decide whether their presence also interfered with the defendant's rights.
33. 381 U.S. at 535. Estes was on trial for swindling. Id. at 534. Despite a change of venue,
the trial attracted a great deal of public attention. Id. at 535-36. Estes sought reversal of his
conviction solely because of the televising of his trial. The Court held that televising per se denied
Estes due process, and reversed the conviction. Id. at 543-44, 552.
34. Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 534-35; id. at 614 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 539-40.
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reporter is not permitted to bring his typewriter or printing press. '37
But the majority immediately qualified this blunt assertion. The Jus-
tices asserted that radio and television equipment was barred solely be-
cause it was, as then operated and perceived, a hazard to a fair trial;
they then added that when the hazard no longer exists "we will have
another case."' 38 Thus, Estes cannot be understood unequivocally to
deny a possible first amendment interest of broadcasters in the use of
their equipment. Rather, the case might be read to mean that in a bal-
ance of conflicting constitutional claims, due process prevailed.3 9
The concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren supports this
reading. Warren agreed that the reason for prohibiting cameras from
the courtroom is that their presence endangers the right to due process
of law. 40 Only Justice Harlan appears to have concluded that techno-
logical access does not raise a first amendment issue.41 He argued that
the ability of the press to use any method of memorializing what they
observed at trial depended upon the court's discretion, and he inti-
mated that the Constitution provides no right to bring the reporter's
paraphernalia-including pencils and and notebooks-into the court-
room.
4 2
Of the Justices who decided Estes only Stewart, Brennan, and
White remain on the Court today. All dissented in that case,43 explic-
itly identifying the first amendment issue that the majority neglected.
Justice Stewart, writing for the dissenters, cautioned that in deciding
whether Estes received a fair trial, "we move in an area touching the
realm of free communication . . . . I would be wary of imposing any
per se rule which, in the light of future technology, might serve to stifle
or abridge true First Amendment rights."44 While Stewart did not
37. Id. at 540.
38. Id. See also id. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
39. Justice Harlan explicitly stated in his concurrence that he applied a balancing test. Id. at
587. He also suggested, however, that technological access does not raise a first amendment ques-
tion, so that he appears to have weighed the sixth amendment interests of a defendant against a
nonconstitutional interest of the press and public. Id. at 589-90 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 584 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Just as an ordinary citizen might be prohibited from using field glasses or a motion
picture camera in the courthouse because by so doing he would interfere with the con-
duct of the trial, representatives of the press and broadcasting industries are subject to
similar limitations when they attend court. Since the televising of criminal trials diverls the
trial processfrom its proper end it must be prohibited
Id. (emphasis added). Neither this concurrence nor the majority opinion suggested that the first
amendment was not implicated. At most, one could say that the nature of the press's competing
interest was not defined.
41. Id. at 589-90 (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. Id.
43. See id. at 601 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Black, Brennan, and White, JJ.).
44. Id. at 604. See also id. at 614-15.
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define the precise nature of the rights at issue, what he wrote did sug-
gest that he was concerned with technological access. He asserted that
the first amendment creates a presumption that favors the press's pres-
ence, including the presence of its technological tools. When un-
resolved issues of fact regarding the effects of press presence are
involved, he argued, the press should receive the benefit of that pre-
sumption.45 One might infer that Justice Stewart understood the first
amendment to forbid per se restrictions on the ability of reporters to
employ the tools of their trade in covering a public event in the absence
of clearly demonstrated harm to other substantial interests.
Chandler v. Florida,4 6 the case to be decided this term, will provide
the Court with its first opportunity to reconsider the Estes problem. In
the fifteen years since Estes was decided, only two Supreme Court cases
have addressed problems concerning the use of modern news-gathering
technology.47 Neither involved the use of cameras in the courtroom.
Moreover, neither served to clarify the post-Estes uncertainty about a
possible first amendment right of technological access.
The first of these two cases, Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc.,48 grew out of the criminal trial of several former White House
aides for conspiracy and obstruction of justice.49 Warner Communica-
tions sought to reproduce portions of the twenty-two hours of tape re-
cordings of presidential meetings and telephone conversations that had
been introduced into evidence at the trial. Warner presented argu-
ments on common law, first amendment, and sixth amendment
grounds. The Court found that the common law right to inspect and
copy judicial records did not extend to the making of an aural record-
ing of a tape. Warner's first amendment argument was similarly re-
jected. The Court, citing Estes, stated that the press's right of access
went no further than the general public's right. The public at large had
been permitted to hear the tapes but had never been given access to the
tapes themselves.50
Finally, Warner urged the Court to grant access to the tapes be-
cause denial of access would violate the sixth amendment's public trial
guarantee.5' The Court, assuming for the sake of argument that
45. Id. at 615.
46. 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), prob. juris. noted, 100 S. Ct. 1832 (1980).
47. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. 589 (1978).
48. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
49. Id. at 592.
50. Id. at 609.
51. Id. at 610.
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Warner had standing to raise this claim, rejected it, relying on Estes to
support a conclusion that "there is no constitutional right to have [ei-
ther live or taped] testimony recorded and broadcast. '52 If the press
and public have no right to record the actual trial on film or tape, the
Warner Court reasoned, then afortiori they can have no right to make
an out-of-court recording of taped testimony. But the reliance of the
Warner majority on Estes is unjustified. Estes did not decide that there
is no first amendment right to record trials; rather, the case held only
that recording would not be permitted when it threatened a defendant's
right to due process of law.53
Warner should be viewed skeptically as a statement about the
existence or nonexistence of the right of technological access, and not
merely because it makes questionable use of precedent. First, Warner
Communications could not copy the tapes without physical access to
them, and the Court pointed out that physical access to judicial records
traditionally has been subject to limitation at the discretion of the
judge.5 4 Second, the case dealt with a highly unusual and sensitive set
of facts and parties. The party seeking to prevent reproduction of the
tapes was a former President of the United States, thus implicating dif-
ficult issues of executive privilege. Under such circumstances, the
Court may, understandably, have been less concerned with its develop-
ment of the law than with its desire to reach an appropriate result. 55
In Houchins v. KQED, Inc5 6 a San Francisco radio and television
broadcaster and local branches of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People claimed that a series of limitations on
their ability to visit and report on conditions in the Alameda County
Jail in Santa Rita, California, violated the first amendment. KQED
listed among its complaints an objection to the warden's refusal to per-
mit reporters to bring cameras or tape recorders into the jail.57 The
Court held, four to three, that the warden's refusal to allow the press
52. Id.
53. See notes 33-39 supra and accompanying text.
54. 435 U.S. at 598-99.
55. Justice Holmes had in mind such cases when he wrote the often-quoted line, "Great cases
like hard cases make bad law." Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Some evidence that the Supreme Court found Warner to be one such
"hard case" may be found in the emphasis in the majority and dissenting opinions on the unusu-
ally sensitive nature of the problem to be resolved. See 435 U.S. at 603, 615 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Further support for the notion that Warner should be viewed as suigeneris may be gleaned
from the fact that when the Court decided the next case involving the media's use of communica-
tions teclmology to gather news, no member of the Court cited Warner as precedent. See
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
56. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
57. Id. at 5.
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and the public to visit the so-called Greystone area of the jail or to
interview prisoners did not violate KQED's first amendment rights.
But Justice Stewart, who concurred in the judgment, agreed with the
three dissenters58 that the trial court acted properly in ordering the war-
den to permit the press to bring in its cameras, tape recorders, and
video equipment.: 9 Justice Stewart explicity stated that once the jail
was open to the press, the press had a first amendment right to "effec-
tive" access to the facility. Effective access would require the warden to
allow cameras and tape recorders when they created no serious risks to
prison security.60
The Supreme Court has therefore not definitively decided whether
the first amendment includes a right of technological access. This Arti-
cle argues that such a right is implicit in the first amendment and that it
warrants recognition.
B. The Derivation of First Amendment Protection for Technological
Access.
In the past, when parties have argued in favor of allowing the
press to use cameras to cover trials, they have relied on two legal theo-
ries: that bans on the use of media technology violate the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment, and that such bans are prior
restraints on speech in violation of the first amendment. Neither argu-
ment has been widely accepted.
The equal protection rationale has been that because print report-
ers may use notebook and pen to record dialogue and impressions, the
reporters in other media should be free to use the equipment appropri-
ate to their media. If this kind of evenhanded treatment is denied, re-
porters are not treated in a functionally equal way: none but the
traditional print journalists may exploit the full potential of their me-
dium of communication.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Estes. Justice Clark,
writing for the Court, made it clear that as long as courts treat televi-
sion reporters and photojournalists the same as print journalists-that
is, permit them to be present in the court and take notes-they have
58. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Powell dissented. Id. at 19. Justices Marshall and Black-
mun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 16.
59. Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart concurred in the reversal of the prelim-
inary injunction issued by the district court only because he found the injunction overbroad. He
did not foreclose the possibility of more limited injunctive relief on remand in order to ensure
press access.
60. Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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received equal protection. 61 This view is entirely consistent with the
Court's strict treatment generally of equal protection. The equal pro-
tection clause, as the Court interprets it, does not guarantee functional
equality; it merely ensures that insofar as individuals are similarly situ-
ated, they will receive similar treatment. The government remains free
to give dissimilar treatment to individuals insofar as they differ in any
significant way.62
The prior restraint argument was not addressed by the Court in
Estes, but this theory is also imperfect. A prior restraint directly inter-
feres with the dissemination of information once it has been obtained.
Thus, if a court seized a videotape of a trial after it had been made, or
ordered a station not to air it, a prior restraint would clearly be in-
volved.63 But a refusal to allow the videotaping to take place at all,
while it may have the same ultimate affect as a prior restraint, does not
fit squarely within the traditional definition, and most courts have been
unwilling to treat such refusals as prior restraints.64
This Article proposes a third approach, which flows from the gen-
eral premise that the first amendment protects speech in all its aspects
from interference by the government except when compelling reasons
exist for imposing carefully tailored restrictions. To put it simply,
speech activities are presumed to be legitimate.65 One aspect of the
protected activity we call speech is the process of gathering information
61. 381 U.S. at 539-40.
62. A graphic example of the difference between strict and functional equal protection and
how the Court views the problem is found in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). In that case,
plaintiffs objected to California's exclusion of disability coverage for normal pregnancy from a
state disability insurance plan that was otherwise comprehensive and that covered every conceiva-
ble disability which could befall a male. If the Court treated working women as functionally
equal to working men, it would have ruled that disabilities peculiar to women could not be singled
out for exclusion from an insurance program designed to secure incomes of workers who were
physically unable to work. Instead, the Court held for the state, finding that it was no violation of
the rule of "similarly situated, similarly treated" to treat women differently from men as to a
characteristic exclusive to their gender. Id. at 494. See generally Comment, Gelduldig v. Aiello:
Pregnancy Classiflcations and the Defnition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 441 (1975).
63. See, e.g., United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that a court
order proscribing the publication of sketches of courtroom scenes was an invalid prior restraint).
64. See, eg., CBS, Inc. v. Lieberman, 439 F. Supp. 862, 865-66 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (an order
banning the television filming of an administrative hearing was not a prior restraint). See also
United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629,
631-32 (5th Cir. 1967). Both cases strongly imply, although they do not explicitly hold, that orders
banning sketching and photography are not prior restraints. But see Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430
F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1970) (a rule banning photography and broadcasting anywhere in or around a
federal building that contains a court was an invalid prior restraint).
65. This premise is derived not from a particular case but from the generally preferred posi-
tion which speech activities enjoy under the American constitutional scheme. See note 139 infra.
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and selecting a form in which it will be communicated to others. 66 This
process is called, in relation to the press, news-gathering.
The Supreme Court has recognized that news-gathering, as a nec-
essary precursor of communication, must enjoy some protection under
the first amendment, although it has yet to delineate the precise nature
and scope of that protection. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 'Vir-
ginia,67 the Court for the first time recognized a first amendment right
to be present at trials, and suggested that the Constitution may also
provide a right to attend other government proceedings and to obtain
other important information from the government. How far the, Court
will extend the first amendent right to information is uncertain, particu-
larly in view of its reluctance prior to Richmond Newspapers to force
the government, absent a statutory directive, to divulge its operations to
the public and the press.68
The recognition in RichmondNewspapers that the first amendment
gives a right to gather information from government is entirely consis-
tent with a constitutional right of technological access. The right pro-
posed here, however, does not depend upon a constitutional right to be
present at a proceeding or event. Technological access should be avail-
able as of right whenever the government opens a proceeding to the
public, even if it does so at its discretion rather than at the command of
the Constitution. Given the uncertain scope of Richmond Newspapers,
there may be many important events that the Court would not, as a
constitutional matter, order the government to open. Nevertheless, for
political reasons or by custom, the government will open these events
voluntarily. In these situations, recognition of a right of technological
access would allow the press to carry out its role as surrogate for those
who cannot attend by enabling reporters to memorialize the informa-
tion they obtain in the form they choose.69 This choice is so closely
66. Numerous cases suggest that the Supreme Court ordinarily will protect the speaker's
right not merely to communicate but also to select the form in which the communication will
occur and to engage in activities which are necessary to produce speech. See, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (spending money to support political campaigns is protected both as
speech and as a necessary predicate for speech); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (words
written on a jacket are a form of protected speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Commu-
nity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing a black armband as an antiwar symbol is protected
speech). But f United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (suggesting but not deciding that
draft card burning may not be speech for first amendment purposes).
67. 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2828-29 (1980); id. at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring).
68. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368
(1979) (the sixth amendment right to a public trial does not give the press an enforceable right to
attend pretrial hearings). An example of a statutory right to obtain information from the govern-
ment is that provided by the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. 111978).
69. This Article does not purport to decide whether the government can ever condition access
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akin to recognized first amendment rights, such as the right to commu-
nicate through a painting or a film rather than an essay,70 that there is
no clear reason to deny it. Recognition of technological access as a first
amendment right would be of primary importance to photographers
and to reporters for the electronic media, but print journalists, scholars,
and other citizens would also benefit, both as speakers and as members
of the audience.
At least a rudimentary recognition of technological access already
exists in Supreme Court, lower federal court, and state court opinions.
The cases acknowledge that the government cannot interfere with the
rights of individuals to make written notes to aid them in transmitting
information to others.71 Courts have also generally agreed that the
press may sketch scenes of the courtroom while the trial is in progress. 72
They have usually assumed, however, that this minimal degree of tech-
nological access fully satisfies the first amendment.73
to information upon the recipient's willingness to forego the right to record it in a manner of his
choice. For example, the President might agree to grant an interview to a small group of reporters
on the condition that they not bring cameras or tape recorders. There might be reasons to justify
this restriction, while nevertheless finding similar restriction imposed by the President on media
covering a public speech or public news conference to be invalid. This Article will confine itself to
considering those events the public traditionally may attend. A trial is such an event. The right of
the public to attend trials was customary under Anglo-American law, and has now been accorded
first amendment protection. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
Other proceedings may be open by statute to the public and press. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b
(1976) (the proceedings of federal agencies are to be conducted in public except under enumerated
circumstances). Still others may be open by custom or become de facto public because the govern-
ment has chosen to admit a large cross-section of individuals. An example would be a press
conference open to accredited journalists.
70. See note 6 supra and notes 92-93 infra.
71. A federal district court, reviewing a claim of technological access to an administrative
proceeding stated: "Defendants. . . concede a First Amendment Right in those attending tile
hearing to record or memorialize that which they see and hear by paper and pencil. No authority
to the contrary has come to our attention." CBS, Inc. v. Lieberman, 439 F. Supp. 862, 866 (N.D.
Ill. 1976). The author's search has similarly failed to uncover contrary authority, except for one
statement by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in Estes, 381 U.S. at 590; see text accompa-
nying note 42 supra. The Maryland Court of Appeals in Sigma Delta Chi v. Speaker, Maryland
House of Delegates, 270 Md. 1, 8, 310 A.2d 156, 160 (1973), suggested that a ban on the use of pen
and paper would be unconstitutional because it might "frustrate all effective communication."
(Emphasis in original.) The Court, however, found a ban on tape recorders only "a mere inconve-
nience." See also Nevens v. City of Chino, 233 Cal. App. 2d 775, 778, 44 Cal. Rptr. 50, 52 (1965)
(an attempt to bar the use of a tape recorder to record public governmental functions would
constitute an improper use of government power). But Vf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-24
(1974) (suggesting that while the availability to prisoners of one mode of communication does not
automatically extinguish an interest in other modes, the existence of alternatives is relevant in
deciding if the restriction violates the first amendment).
72. United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974); Inre NBC, 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d
695 (1974).
73. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 539-40; CBS, Inc. v. Lieberman, 439 F. Supp. 862




Even those courts that have recognized a broader first amendment
right to choose an appropriate method of news-gathering have said lit-
tle to articulate the scope of the right or the reasons for it. Before Estes,
two of the three state courts that favored televised trials specifically
held that the first amendment guarantees technological access. 74 The
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals simply found that the first
amendment ensures a right to equal treatment in news-gathering, by
which it meant the ability to use the technological tools appropriate to
each medium.75 The Georgia Court of Appeals articulated more thor-
oughly its reasons for ruling that a ban on technological access violates
the Constitution:
We ... recognize that there are inherent differences in the methods
used by these newer types of newsgathering media and that they
should not be so hemmed and hedged about as to be hampered in the
exercise of the natural advantages which they enjoy, to wit, the tran-
scribing on tape of the actual voices of those making the news or on
film or "videotape" not only their voices but their images.76
Since Estes, however, most courts have been reluctant to pursue and
refine this line of analysis, even outside the context of criminal trials.
Some have specifically cited Estes as controlling precedent; even when
Estes is not specifically cited, however, one may reasonably presume its
influence.77
In spite of Estes, a few federal and state courts have continued to
hint that the Constitution offers at least some protection to the re-
porter's right to gather news by the means of his choice. In 1969, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a trial court's dismis-
sal of a section 198378 action alleging that the City of Chicago and the
Chicago police interfered with the plaintiff's attempt to photograph
demonstrations at the 1968 Democratic National Convention. 79 The
74. Hudson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 192, 196, 132 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1963) (the court, however,
held that a defendant's objection to the presence of a radio microphone should have been sus-
tained because of the priority of the defendant's right of a fair trial); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734,
740-41 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958). A third state, Colorado, declined to adopt Canon 35 of the
ABA's Canons of Judicial Ethics, see note 250 infra, because the rule conflicted with the free
speech and public trial provisions of the Colorado Constitution. In re Hearings Concerning Ca-
non 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956).
75. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734, 740-41 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958) (televising of criminal trial).
76. Hudson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 192, 196, 132 S.E.2d 508, 510 (1963) (radio broadcast of
criminal trial).
77. See note 31 supra.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
79. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084 (7th Cir. 1969). Accord, Channel 10, Inc. v.
Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 1972) (a declaratory judgment that police acted
improperly in seizing a television camera and film from a reporter covering a burglary): "Defend-
ants have made no claim before this court that [the reporter] was in an improper place and it
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court concluded that "the complaint sufficiently alleges that constitu-
tionally protected activity was and continues to be interfered with by
the named defendants . . ... 8 It did not elaborate, however, on the
nature of the constitutional interest in taking photographs. In 1974, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upset a ban on the sketching of
courtroom proceedings. The court found that sketching was neither
obtrusive nor disruptive, and that the ban, which "touches on matters
protected by the First Amendment," could not stand.81 Again the court
did not explore the question further. New Jersey and California courts
have also held that municipalities acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
barring the use of tape recorders at public meetings of local govern-
ment, finding that the rules infringed indirectly but significantly upon
the first amendment without any reasonable countervailing public in-
terest to justify that infringement.8 2 They, too, said little more.
Thus far, the most cogent exploration of the issue has been made
by the sole Supreme Court Justice to grapple with the question of
whether the press should have a protected right to gather news with
cameras and other equipment. Justice Stewart, who has been particu-
larly interested in attempting to establish an independent function for
the press clause of the first amendment,8 3 argued in Houchins . KQED,
Inc.84 that the press must be free to bring cameras and sound equip-
ment inside the county jail so that the reporters can convey "the jail's
sights and sounds to those who cannot personally visit the place." 85
This accommodation is required, Stewart says, because the Constitu-
tion "requires sensitivity" to the critical role played by the press in
American society and to "the special needs of the press in performing it
effectively."' 86 Stewart explained techological access as a right essential
for effective news-gathering.
A failure to adopt Justice Stewart's view of the right to gather
news will prevent modern communicators from fully exploiting the ca-
pabilities of their media. This failure will impose upon media that are
capable of conveying sights and sounds the methodology that was com-
seems that employees of the news media have a right to be in public places or on public property
to gather information, photographically or otherwise."
80. Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir. 1969).
81. United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102, 107 (5th Cir. 1974).
82. Nevens v. City of Chino, 233 Cal. App. 2d 775, 778, 44 Cal. Rptr. 50, 51-52 (1965); Sudol
v. Borough of North Arlington, 137 N.J. Super. 149, 155, 348 A.2d 216, 218 (1975).
83. See Stewart, "Or ofthe Press," 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
84. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
85. Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring). This notion was adopted in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia by Chief Justice Burger, who stressed that media act as "surrogates for the public."
I00 S. Ct. at 2825.
86. 438 U.S. at 17.
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pletely satisfactory only when media were limited to the printed word.
When the first amendment was adopted, the mass communicators were
the publishers of eighteenth century broadsheets and pamphlets; now
they are the national television and radio networks. The Supreme
Court firmly recognizes that speech can occur in a variety of forms,87
many of which were unknown or arguably unpalatable to the fram-
ers.88 The decision to limit constitutional protection of news-gathering
to the techniques of two centuries ago is therefore out of harmony with
the Supreme Court's own view of the flexibility of the first amendment.
This Article attempts, therefore, to expand upon Justice Stewart's
suggestion in Houchins. It articulates the reasons why the choice of a
method of news-gathering is an integral part of freedom of speech and,
as such, should enjoy constitutional protection. The argument depends
on an analysis both of the function and purpose of the first amendment,
and of the inherent nature of the various media.
The outer reaches of the protection of free speech remain vague,
and no single theory of free press and free speech commands universal
acceptance.8 9 Scholars and judges agree, however, that the first amend-
ment was designed to enhance and protect participation by the individ-
ual citizen in the process of self-government.90 Freedom to discuss and
to criticize federal, state, and local government is the very bedrock of
the amendment. 9' Many forms of communication that are not explic-
itly political also nourish intelligent participation in a democratic soci-
ety; for that reason, the Supreme Court has evolved a system of
protections that encompasses speech diverse in content and form.
Novels, painting, and drama,92 communications that entertain and
87. See note 6 supra and note 92 infra.
88. See Gellhorn, Dirty Books, Disgusting Pictures, and Dreadful Laws, 8 GA. L. REV. 291,
296-97 & n.21 (1974), and Henkin, Morals andthe Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLtJM.
L. REV. 391 (1963), for discussion of general prohibitions against blasphemy in the states at the
time the Constitution was framed. Such laws would now be deemed to violate the first amend-
ment. See generally L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960) for the theory that the framers of
the first amendment intended solely to create a no prior restraint rule.
89. See generally Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963).
90. See, e.g., id. 882-83; Meiklejohn, The First Amendment IsAn Absolute, 1961 S. CT. REV.
245, 255; Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REV. 891, 896 (1949). See generally Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1
(1965); Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979).
91. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
92. "Motion pictures are of course a different medium of expression than the public speech,
the radio, the stage, the novel, or the magazine. But the First Amendment draws no distinction
between the various methods of communicating ideas." Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of
Educ., 346 U.S. 587, 589 (1954) (per curiam) (Douglas, J., concurring). "
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communications that inform,93 all fall within the realm of protected
expression.
Recognizing the range and breadth of forms in which speech oc-
curs, the law has responded by extending protection to newer commu-
nication technologies as they develop. Despite some anomalous
holdings,94 the Supreme Court has held that movies, radio, and televi-
sion all come within the purview of the first amendment.95 The Court
has thus far failed to consider systematically the relationship between
the means used to produce speech and the speech itself. Yet technolog-
ical advances have altered not merely the facility with which we com-
municate, but the content of the communication as well. A few
examples illustrate this point. Many early societies, when they devel-
oped a written language, used tablets of clay or stone to memorialize
their writings. 96 The invention of early papers made from rag, parch-
ment, or papyrus opened an entirely new dimension in communication
because written speech could be made portable, private, and far more
discursive.97 Written language became a suitable vehicle for artists and
interpretive scholars.98 The invention of the printing press added an-
other dimension to the range of communication because manuscripts
no longer needed to be laboriously hand copied; books therefore ceased
to be the private preserve of princes of church and state. With the ad-
vent of widespread literacy, spurred by the printing press, the nature of
books changed to respond to a new audience. The prelates and nobles
93. "We do not accede to appellees suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free
press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining
is too elusive for the protection of that basic right. . . . What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine." Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). See also Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952).
94. See notes 7-15 supra and accompanying text.
95. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388-90 (1969) (broadcasting is covered
by the first amendment); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) (movies);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948) ("moving pictures, like news-
papers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment").
96. Minoan Linear A and B scripts were inscribed on clay tablets; the Hittites, too, used clay
tablets as writing material. P. MACKENDRICK, THE GREEK STONES SPEAK 81-89 (1962). The
earliest Egyptian hieroglyphs are found on seal stones, stone vases, and on wood or clay boards. J.
WHITE, ANCIENT EGYPT: ITS CULTURE AND HISTORY 87 (1970).
97. Paper, in the modem sense, was invented by the Chinese, probably at the beginning of
the second century. U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PAPERMAKING 8 (1968). It was not used in
Europe, where books continued to be written on parchment, until the 12th century; modern paper
was introduced to Europe by the Moorish conquerors of Spain. Id 18.
98. Early stone and clay writings, such as the Linear A and Linear B tablets, were used
primarily to make inventories and lists. The Homeric poems appear to have developed through
an oral tradition, and not from early stone and clay writings, which give no evidence of being used
for purposes in any sense "literary," either in content or style. P. MACKENDRICK, supra note 96, at
89.
[Vol. 1980:641
Vol. 1980:641] 0 VERCOMING FUTURE SHOCK
who commissioned medieval manuscripts would hardly have en-
couraged a novelist like Daniel DeFoe or a social critic like Thomas
Paine.99
Well before the invention of radio and television, the evolution of
modern communications technology influenced the content of speech.
The photograph became commonplace by the middle of the nineteenth
century, and journalists quickly adopted the camera to cover the Cri-
mean War and the Civil War.100 Those journalists produced a docu-
mentation of tragedies that remains stark and moving to modern
viewers. The invention of the telegraph also changed the character of
communications by transforming the local newspaper into a national
and international disseminator of news, and by including isolated
towns and villages in a national and international communications net-
work. 0 1 Motion pictures added a further refinement by communicat-
ing images in action.t10
The various communications media-television, radio, photogra-
phy, and the printed word--do not produce speech that is interchange-
99. By the 14th Century, families that had grown wealthy in the pursuit of commerce joined
the nobility and the clergy as part of the small clientele for privately owned religious books, chiv-
alric romances, and allegories. B. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR 453 (1978). Writing during the
Middle Ages relied primarily on commissions and patronage support. See id 238. The develop-
ment of printing in the middle of the 15th Century radically changed the picture. Id. 594-95.
Prior to the invention of movable type,
texts in private ownership were the sole source of knowledge and reproduction of the
work. Simultaneous duplication of copies, in anticipation of further sales, was under-
taken by stationers only when a book became well-known and frequently wanted. It was
not until printing that large-scale speculative book production and marketing became
possible, from which arose the system of directly commissioning or accepting work from
authors and translators, who are remunerated according to the number of copies sold or
likely to be sold, instead of the old method of request, presentation, and reward between
amateurs (neither authors nor patrons regarding literature as their main vocation or
source of profit).
Doyle, The Social Context of AMedieval English Literature, in THE AGE OF CHAUCER 81 (B. Ford
ed. rev. ed. 1959). See also J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, supra note 16, at 165-67.
100. B. NEWHALL, THE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 67 (1964). For a capsule history of early
photojournalism, see id. 67-81.
101. According to one commentator, 19th Century technology was what transformed the press
into "a mass audience medium." D. Shaw, Technology. Freedomfor What, in MASS MEDIA AND
THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 64 (R. Farrar & J. Stevens eds. 1971). Shaw attributes the transfor-
mation to the invention of the high speed power press, improvement in paper manufacture, and
the invention of the telegraph, which permitted the creation and growth of the news wire services.
Id. 75.
102. Thomas A. Edison and his assistant, William Dickson, perfected the motion picture be-
tween 1889 and 1891. T. RAMSAYE, A MILLION AND ONE NIGHTS: A HISTORY OF THE MOTION
PICTURE THROUGH 1925, at 65-73 (1926). The earliest commercial films were 50 feet or less in
length, id. 85; movies were not successfully projected onto a screen until about 1895. Id. 129. By
the end of the century, this new medium had been adopted by journalists who made the first
motion picture documentaries. Reporters filmed troops departing for the Spanish-American War
in 1897, and two years later captured on film a fire in the Windsor Hotel in New York City, in
which 45 persons died. Id. 389-93.
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able. They engage our senses and our intellects in different ways. An
historian of photography verbalized this difference in describing the
impact of a Civil War photograph: "This man lived; this is the spot
where he fell; this is how he looked in death. There lies the great psy-
chological difference between photography and the other graphic arts;
this is the quality which photography can impart more strongly than
any other picture making."'' 0 3 Voice recordings also engage our under-
standing not only through the words we hear but also through intona-
tion, pace, and volume; films and television engage our visual and
aural senses simultaneously. Because no one medium completely con-
veys all sense and feeling, the speaker's choice of how to present an
idea or observation is a crucial aspect of the decision about what he or
she will say.
Even the physical characteristics of each medium affect the nature
of the communication for both speaker and audience. The print media
are bounded by space; the electronic media are bounded by time.
Newspapers, books, and magazines communicate by words printed on
pages of fixed dimension and number. Literate "hearers" can read and
reread, analyzing and clarifying their perceptions. Illustrations and
photographs may be added to express what words do not adequately
convey. Television and radio, by contrast, are confined by time, and
cannot rely on the accumulation of descriptive word patterns. Were a
radio or television reporter to adopt the technique of the print journal-
ist, the attempt to duplicate orally the prose in a brief newspaper story
would consume a substantial portion of a typical half hour news broad-
cast. Reporters for these media must, therefore, mix words with sounds
and pictures in order to portray the events about which they report.
Since audiences vary in their understanding of different forms of com-
munication, the availability of information from a variety of media
protects not only the interests of the speaker but the interests of the
hearer as well. A rule of constitutional law that treats the written word
as the measure of free speech will effectively favor the most literate
audiences and will undervalue the interests of those who comprehend
best visually and aurally.
Because each medium possesses a unique capacity to communi-
cate, government restrictions on the choice of media used to record and
103. B. NEWHALL, supra note 100, at 71. See also R. Schuneman, Pholographic Coinnunica-
lion: .4n Evolving Historical.Discopine, in MASS MEDIA AND THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 130-58
(R. Farrar & J. Stevens eds. 1971), for an evaluation of the unique contribution of visual informa-
tion through the medium of photography. Schuneman notes, for example, that for many people
the years of the Great Depression are most effectively evoked by Dorothea Lange's stark photo-
graph of a migrant worker and her children. Id. 139.
[Vol. 1980:641
Vol. 1980:641] OVERCOMING FUTURE SHOCK
convey information inevitably involve first amendment values. 0 4 Of
course, not all communication technologies are linked to content in the
same degree, but even where the connection between technology and
content is attenuated, other considerations implicate the first amend-
ment. For example, when courts prevent press reporters from tape re-
cording trials, the accuracy of their accounts may be diminished. 10 5
The speech and press clauses of the first amendment protect the gather-
ing of news 0 6 in order to guarantee effective reporting; this protection
of news-gathering would extend to a right of access with means calcu-
lated to produce the most accurate news. t0 7
Restrictions on technology may also "chill" the willingness to
speak and may reduce the flow of information. One reason frequently
cited for the dearth of reporting about the judiciary on radio and televi-
sion is the restrictions on televising trials and appeals, and the resulting
ineffectiveness of news coverage about them. 0 8 Broadcasters claim
that verbal summaries and artists' sketches are too stilted to be used to
104. One court rejected the argument that limits on technology directly restrain the content of
speech. Garrett v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir. 1977) (denying the right to film an execu-
tion), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978):
In order to sustain Garrett's argument we would have to find that the moving picture of
the actual execution possessed some quality giving it "content" beyond, for example, that
possessed by a simulation of the execution. We discern no such quality from the record
or from our inferences therein. Despite the unavailability of film of the actual execution
the public can be fully informed; the free flow of ideas and information need not be
inhibited.
This Article argues that the Garrett court's conclusion is incorrect. Justice Brennan's dissent in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), supports the author's position:
Moreover, it is doubtful that even those frustrated listeners in a position to follow
my Brother Powell's gratuitous advice and attend one of Carlin's performances or
purchase one of his records would receive precisely the same message Pacifica's radio
station sent its audience. The airways are capable not only of carrying a message, but
also of transforming it. A satirist's monologue may be most potent when delivered to a
live audience; yet the choice whether this will in fact be the manner in which the message
is delivered and received is one the First Amendment prohibits the government from
making.
105. For a recent review of restrictions by government bodies on the use of tape recorders in
courts and at public meetings, see 20 FREEDOM OF INFORMATION DIGEST 1 (1978).
106. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
107. Accurate reporting deserves constitutional protection because the protection enables the
press to fulfill its role of providing the public with the information it needs to participate intelli-
gently in self-government. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (an informed public is necessary to self-governance); Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (holding invalid a tax on the advertising revenue of newspapers because
it limited "the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitu-
tional guaranties").
108. "Exclusion of cameras from courtrooms sharply limits the American people in obtaining
much of this information [about the judicial process]. The process of using artists' sketches is so
expensive and appears so stilted on TV that TV editors often decide not to cover judicial proceed-
ings." Spann, Cameras in the Courtroom--for Better orfor Worse 64 A.B.A.J. 797 (1978) (William
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report trials and hearings. Furthermore, restrictions on photographing
the inside of courts drastically diminish the possibility of producing
documentaries on the operations of courts and the administration of
justice. 0 9
Ironically, the same courts that until recently refused to explore
the technological access issue have provided support for the view that
modem media technologies convey unique information. A number of
state and federal courts today regularly permit the use of tape record-
ings, and more recently videotapes, as evidence in criminal and civil
trials on the theory that the court and the jury will receive a more com-
plete picture of events and testimony from these technologies than they
would from a cold transcript." 0 In Hendricks v. Swenson,"' t for exam-
ple, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed a habeas peti-
tion of a murderer convicted after the jury viewed his videotaped
confession. The court denied the petition, concluding that the video-
tape provided more protection for the defendant than a written tran-
script would have. "If he is hesitant, uncertain, or faltering, such facts
will appear. If he has been worn out by interrogation, physically
abused, or in other respects is acting involuntarily, the tape will corrob-
orate him in ways a typewritten statement would not."'" 2 The majority
then noted that "[flor jurors to see as well as to hear the events sur-
rounding an alleged confession or incriminating statement is a forward
step in the search for truth."'"1 3
E. Spann, writing in his capacity as President of the American Bar Association). See also Gra-
ham, Cameras in the Courtroom, A Dialogue, 64 A.B.A.J. 545, 547 (1978).
109. An example of the kind of news documentary possible if cameras are permitted to film
trials is "ABC News Closeup-The Shooting of Big Man," shown over the American Broadcast-
ing Company network in June of 1979. The program, produced with the aid of Harvard Law
School, showed viewers the investigation, preparation, and actual trial of a defendant charged
with assault with intent to murder. For a description of the documentary, see N.Y.L.J., June 8,
1979, at 1, col. 3. Documentaries have also been made in Colorado, which continued to permit
televising of trials despite Estes. See note 151 infra (describing the Colorado decision);
Simonberg, TV in Court: The Wide World of Torts, 7 JURIS DOCTOR 41, 42 (1977) (describing
programs). In addition to increased news coverage, liberalized rules will also permit production of
educational materials-using actual trials-for use by law schools and others. See Weinstein &
Zimmerman, Let the People Observe Their Courts, 61 JUDICATURE 156, 163-64 (1977).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a) permit the taking of depositions by
other than stenographic means. For descriptions of federal court use of videotape, see, e.g., FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ANNUAL REPORT 16 (1976); Footlick, Tralvision, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7,
1977, at 66; Videotape to Serve New Function, 2 THE SECOND CIRCUIT NEWSLETTER 8 (1977). For
descriptions of use by state courts, see note 220 infra and text accompanying notes 114-16, 218-22
infra.
111. 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972).
112. Id. at 506.
113. Id. at 507.
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California, which conducted a careful review of the use of video-
tape in the state's criminal justice system,' 14 similarly concluded that
showing videotaped testimony of an unavailable witness at a trial was
superior to reading a deposition: "The preservation of verbal testi-
mony as well as the aural and visual indicants of demeanor and credi-
bility provide the trier of fact with a more representative information
base from which to evaluate witness testimony."' 1 5 One court has sug-
gested that videotaped and closed circuit television testimony holds the
attention of jurors more effectively than testimony read from tran-
scripts. 11 6 Even the United States Supreme Court has tacitly admitted
that videotapes sometimes provide a quality of communication that the
written record or verbal testimony cannot duplicate.117
A frequently voiced objection to replacing written transcripts with
videotapes provides additional evidence of the differences between tele-
vision and the written word. Critics argue that giving appellate courts
access to the additional information that videotapes convey will erode
the clearly erroneous standard of review of factual findings. This view
is premised on the notion that reviewing courts will be less likely to
defer to the trial court's expertise as the finder of facts if they may con-
sult a visual and sound recording of the trial. 118 The evidence from
courtrooms, therefore, shows that part of what is told lies in the method
of telling.
In sum, technological access deserves constitutional protection.
The right to gather news, a major factor in the press's ability to inform
the public, should not be limited to the technology of 1791. Both his-
tory and the experience of the courts demonstrate that the electronic
media possess unique capacities to convey information; restricting the
access of these newer media is equivalent to an invalid restraint on
content. To comply with the first amendment, therefore, a right of
technological access must be recognized.
114. ERNEST H. SHORT & ASSOCS., INC., A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ON VIDEO-
TAPE RECORDING IN THE CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: SECOND YEAR FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-10 (1976) (describing the California project).
115. Id. 24.
116. Rubino v. G.D. Searle, 73 Misc. 2d 447, 448, 340 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (Sup. Ct. 1973),
(quoting 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 426 (1970)).
117. Our conclusion that the entire meeting from the beginning until its dispersal by tear
gas was orderly and not riotous is confirmed by a film of the events taken by a television
news photographer, which was offered in evidence as a state exhibit. We have viewed
the film, and it reveals that the students, though they undoubtedly cheered and clapped,
were well-behaved throughout.
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 547 (1965). See also id. n.10.
118. One practical reason that this result is unlikely to occur is that review of a videotaped




C. Responses to the Traditional Arguments Against the Existence of a
Constitutional Right of Technological Access.
Cases denying first amendment protection to the use of media
technology have pursued three different lines of reasoning. The first
two approaches presume that technological access never raises a pro-
tectable interest under the first amendment. One group of courts has
reasoned that rules limiting technological access regulate not the con-
tent of speech, but merely the time, place, and manner of its exercise."19
This form of limitation has long been recognized as fully consistent
with the protections of the first amendment. 120 A second group of
courts has analyzed restrictions on technological access as a variation
on rules that generally limit access to information.' 2' By so classifying
technological access, these courts dismiss press arguments of unconsti-
tutional discrimination by dispensing the bromide that the press has no
greater right to information than the public at large.' 22 The third line
of analysis, rarely explicit, seems to recognize a first amendment inter-
est in technological access, but concludes, after a balancing test, that
119. See, e.g., In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 255-56, 126 A.2d 679, 681 (1956) (quoting American
Communications Assoc. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950)), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957),
which views these rules as a regulation of "conduct ... in the interest of public order," and hence
only "an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment" of the first amendment. Accord, CBS, Inc. v.
Lieberman, 439 F. Supp. 862, 868 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (concerning technological access to administra-
tive agency hearings):
While the content of communication enjoys virtually absolute First Amendment
protection, the manner of communication does not. Thus the time, the place and the
means of communication can be regulated for the purpose of safeguarding other interests
of a free society. . . . Assuming, as defendants concede, that the First Amendment simi-
larly protects the gathering of news at a public hearing, the question remains whether the
manner of gathering news at such a hearing through television filming and taping can be
regulated or prohibited.
(Citations omitted).
120. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (regulation of sound trucks emitting loud noise
does not infringe first amendment rights).
121. See, e.g., Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1958)
(ban on photographer in or near courtroom upheld):
Realizing that we are not dealing with freedom of expression at all but with rules
having to do with gaining access to information on matters of public interest, can it be
argued that here there is some constitutional right for everybody not to be interfered
with in finding out things about everybody else? . . . We think that this question of
getting at what one wants to know. . . is a far cry from the type of freedom of expres-
sion, comment, criticism so fully protected by the first and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution.
Id. See also In re Post-Newsweek Stations Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 774 (Fla. 1979); Brumfield v.
State, 108 So. 2d 33,36 (Fla. 1958). Cf Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610
(1978) (the sixth amendment public trial guarantee does not provide a right of media access);
Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1967) (approvingly citing language from
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (3d Cir. 1958), but not explicitly
following the case).
122. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974);
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
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countervailing interests outweigh it.123 None of these three traditional
arguments is sound.
First, bans on cameras and recording equipment are not merely
time, place, and manner restrictions. Time, place, and manner restric-
tions are permissible because they do not regulate the content of the
message; rather, they restrict the manner in which it is expressed. For
example, public officials cannot bar parades based on the identity or
ideas of the participants, but they can regulate the timing and route of
the march to prevent disruption of traffic or to protect public safety. 124
Furthermore, because these restrictions impinge on constitutional
rights, they must be narrowly tailored to do no more than is necessary
to accommodate the countervailing governmental interest. 125 Courts
strictly scrutinize the government's alleged purpose to ensure that
flimsy assertions of public purpose do not wrongly diminish first
amendment rights. 126
The approach taken in the American Bar Association's Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7), 127 is the primary model for the state
123. This appears to be the conclusion of at least four of the five Justices who compose the
majority in Estes. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. See also Seymour v. United States,
373 F.2d 629, 631-32 (5th Cir. 1967) (suggesting that first amendment rights must be weighed
against those of the sixth amendment); State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St. 370, 373, 123 N.E.2d 8, 10
(1954) (in deciding if a limit on technological access is permissible, the freedom of the press must
be considered in context with "other constitutional guarantees, all of equal importance").
124. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (regulation of demonstration on public
streets); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). See generall, Emerson, supra note 89, at
946-54.
125. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960). See also Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d
558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 1970) (upholding a federal district court rule against photography):
However, constitutional standards restrict the methods by which a court or other
governmental branch can limit the press to the narrowest rules or orders which will ac-
complish the desired goal. The achievement of a legitimate governmental object "cannot
be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in
the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."
126. Dorfman v. Meiszner, 430 F.2d 558, 562 (7th Cir. 1970), for example, is typical in refer-
ring to regulation in the interests of a "legitimate" governmental purpose.
127. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3A(7) reads as follows:
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photographs in the
courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses
between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evidence,
for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial administra-
tion;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, or cere-
monial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate court
proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the dignity
of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or recorded
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and federal prohibitions on cameras in the courtroom.128 Canon 3A(7)
provides in part: "[A] judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising,
recording, or taking photographs in the courtroom and areas immedi-
ately adjacent thereto during sessions of court or recesses between ses-
sions .... ,,t29 The American Bar Association's suggested restriction
on technological access is not a valid time, place, and manner regula-
tion. Because the content conveyed by photographs or the electronic
media cannot be duplicated in written or oral descriptions, the restraint
on access directly restricts speech itself. Moreover, the breadth of the
restraint exceeds its avowed purposes of preventing disruptions of the
court, preserving the fairness of the trial, and protecting the privacy of
litigants. The ban on cameras is absolute:130 the canon prohibits the
use of cameras and electronic recording equipment in courtrooms, their
environs, and frequently anywhere in the building. The restrictions ap-
ply even when the recordation is admittedly quiet and unobtrusive.
They cover not only trials, but also virtually all functions carried out
within a courthouse.13' Yet courts hearing challenges to these
has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and re-
production;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has been
concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in edu-
cational institutions.
In 1979, the Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice was defeated
in its attempt to convince the ABA House of Delegates to modify the provision. ABA Mid-Year
Meeting, 47 U.S.L.W. 2522 (Feb. 20, 1979). The Committee had proposed a new Standard 8-2-
6(a) of the ABA Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press which would have said:
Television, radio and photographic coverage ofjudicial proceedings is not per se incon-
sistent with the right to a fair trial. Subject to conditions and restrictions established by
local rule or by agreement with representatives of the news media, such coverage should
be permitted only if the court in the exercise of sound discretion concludes that it can be
conducted unobtrusively and without distracting the attention of trial participants.
ABA STANDING COMM. ON ASS'N STANDARDS, SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RECOMMENDA-
TIONs RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS IN CRIMINAL CASES 60 (1978). As a result of
the refusal to adopt this proposal, the ABA continues to espouse a position it has maintained since
it first promulgated the predecessor to Canon 3A(7) in 1937. The earlier provision was entitled
Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and, while it differed from Canon 3A(7) in form, it was
substantially similar in content. 62 ABA REP. 14 (1937); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, No. 212 (1941). For the text of Canon 35, see note 250 infra.
For a detailed history of the genesis of the rule in the events surrounding the trial of Bruno
Hauptmann for the kidnapping of the son of Charles A. Lindbergh, see Kielbowicz, The S/or),
Behind the Adoption ofthe Ban on Courtroom Cameras, 63 JUDICATURE 14 (1979).
128. See note 172 infra.
129. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3A(7).
130. Although Canon 3A(7)(c) does permit a limited exception for educational use, see note
127 supra, the ban on news-gathering by the press for anything but ceremonial occasions is abso-
lute.
131. The ABA model permits ceremonial occasions to be photographed and otherwise re-
corded, see Canon 3A(7)(b), note 127 supra. A number of federal district court rules, however, do
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restraints have not considered the possibility that the ban may be over-
broad, even assuming its purposes are valid.
The argument that the press cannot use cameras because reporters
have no greater rights than the public at large is also unconvincing.
This argument derives from cases prior to RichmondNewspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia132 that held that the press could not, anymore than could a
private citizen, compel the government to open records or proceedings
that the government wanted closed. Certainly, when the government is
not required to divulge information, the press has no greater right to it
than the public because neither has a valid claim. The technological
access issue, however, arises only in regard to information already in
the public domain. The question it poses is not what may become pub-
lic, but how the press will record what it may already see and hear, and
how it will transmit that information to the general public.
Justice Stewari, in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.133 argued that the
press, to carry out its special role as surrogate of the public, needs the
benefit of greater protections than those received by individual citi-
zens. 134 The right of technological access proposed by this Article,
however, does not require acceptance of Justice Stewart's theory of ex-
tra protection for the press. Scholars, individuals, and members of in-
formal citizens' groups may have an interest in using modem advances
in communications technology comparable to that of the press. Be-
cause individuals, like the press, are free to express their observations,
they should also be free to couch that speech in the form best suited to
their needs.
The third analysis courts use to deny the right to technological ac-
cess is not usually stated clearly, but appears to balance a presumed
first amendment right to gather news against a variety of countervailing
interests. Because the Supreme Court found such a clear due process
violation in Estes,13 5 it did not dwell on conflicts between due process
and first amendment rights. An analysis of the case, however, reveals
that four of the five justices who voted to reverse Estes's conviction
implicitly balanced the constitutional interests.' 36
not recognize an exception even for ceremonies. See, e.g., FED. LOCAL CT. R. 4(a) (E.D. Cal.);
FED. LOCAL CT. R. 29 (D. Mass.). See also note 163 infra.
132. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980). For a discussion of cases prior to RichmondNewspapers denying
access to the press and public alike, see note 68 supra and accompanying text.
133. 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
134. Id. See also Stewart, supra note 83. A majority of the Court has never accepted Stew-
art's view.
135. 381 U.S. at 544 (any use of television in the courtroom would be inconsistent with due
process).
136. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
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Balancing, as a technique for resolving conflicts over the limits of
first amendment freedoms, is often troubling. By its very nature, the
balancing of unquantifiable constitutional values is imprecise and sus-
ceptible to becoming a post hoc rationalization for a judge's conscious
or unconscious value choices. In Estes, and in the resolution of the
cameras-in-the-courts dilemma generally, balancing is especially
fraught with difficulties because the assertion that technological access
infringes on due process rests upon findings with an empirical base that
can most kindly be described as wobbly. 37 Furthermore, even if due
process were threatened by technological access, balancing does not
dictate that the first amendment should automatically yield. A minor
injury to due process should not be rectified at the expense of a serious
and substantial infringement of the right of free speech. 138 Supreme
137. The problem with the balancing test as applied in the first amendment context is the
difficulty in discerning from the opinions any uniform mode of application to diverse fact situa-
tions. Logically, each balancing of another interest against a valid first amendment claim should
involve the following. First, there should be sufficient care in probing into the underlying facts to
ascertain that the asserted conflict does indeed exist, and furthermore to assess the substantiality of
the damage done to the competing interest by the unrestrained exercise of a first amendment right.
As Professor Emerson has pointed out, the difficulty of such factual determinations has frequently
resulted in the Court's refusing to "question the decision of the legislature unless [its] determina-
tion is 'outside the pale of fair judgment."' Emerson, SUpra note 89, at 913. See, e.g., Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (accepting without question legislative findings about the
relationship between "adult" films and books, and the crime rate). Nevertheless, a substantial
body of case law as well as the implications of the theory itself do suggest the necessity of such
probing, and on a number of occasions courts have actually applied it. For example, in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), the Court criticized the State of Virginia
for failing to offer "more than assertion and conjecture to support its claim that without criminal
sanctions the objectives of [its] statutory scheme would be seriously undermined." Id. at 841. At
issue was a statute subjecting to criminal punishment anyone who reported information about
confidential judicial disciplinary proceedings. The majority stated clearly, "Deference to a legisla-
tive finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake." Id. at 843.
Furthermore, many other cases, not all explicitly using a balancing analysis, have rejected limits
on first amendment rights not because the Court undervalued the conflicting interest but because
it did not believe sufficient proof of injury to that interest had been shown. See, e.g., Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); f Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (a gag order
cannot issue against the press without a showing of imminent and direct harm to the criminal
defendant that cannot be avoided by less intrusive means); New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713 (1971) (before securing a prior restraint against the press, the government must make
a clear showing of imminent and direct harm).
138. An examination of the so-called fair trial-free press cases generated over the past decade
suggests strongly that the Supreme Court and a number of state courts have adjusted conflicts
between the first and sixth amendments on the basis of relative harm. While a defendant's inter-
ests in a fair trial would usually be best served by minimal reporting or by none at all, the courts
have been extremely reluctant to interfere directly with the press to prevent prejudice to defend-
ants. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333,
350 (1966). The Supreme Court in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), did permit a
defendant, with the concurrence of the prosecutor and judge, to close pretrial hearings to the press
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Court holdings indicate that when the balance between confficting in-
terests is uncertain or in equipoise, a presumption favors the right to
speak.' 39
The use of a balancing test to deny technological access to the
press and the public is justified, therefore, only when technological ac-
cess would actually harm another serious and substantial public con-
cern, and when the threatened injury is more serious than the free
speech limitation that must be imposed to prevent it. Judged by this
standard, the current policies restricting technological access, like those
embodied in Canon 3A(7), are unlikely to pass constitutional muster.
To demonstrate why this is so, it will be necessary to evaluate carefully
the reasons advanced to justify those policies. Estes is a logical place to
begin.
and public altogether. With the exception of Justice Powell, however, the Court did not view that
case as presenting a conflict between the first and sixth amendments, *but merely as requiring an
interpretation of the public trial clause of the sixth amendment. In addition, it was a case involv-
ing access to the courtroom rather than freedom to report information once access was obtained.
When a defendant raises a due process claim alleging prejudice caused by extensive, harmful
press publicity before and during the trial, the courts are reluctant to find that defendants have
been so harmed thereby that the court must conclude that a fair trial was impossible. It is difficult
to believe that the courts are convinced that the degree of publicity was meaningless and irrele-
vant. In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975), for example, some jurors who sat on the case
were aware through press reports of defendant's prior criminal activities and convictions. The
most reasonable conclusion, therefore, is that courts are willing to accept as the price of having a
first amendment some damage to defendants that would be unacceptable were it a result of activi-
ties not sheltered by the Constitution. One possible explanation for the difference in outcome
between Murphy and Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), in which the Court reversed a
conviction because of prejudicial publicity, might be that the defendant in Rideau was injured by
actions of a law enforcement officer, clearly subject to state control, while in Murphy no serious
official misconduct was involved. The contrast between the results in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966), and Murphy might be similarly explained. For other examples of massive dam-
aging publicity held not to infringe unacceptably upon sixth amendment rights, see United States
v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); People v. Manson, 61 Cal.
App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977).
139. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) (declaring California's allocation of
the burden of proof of eligibility for a tax exemption unconstitutional): "The vice of the present
procedure is that, where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful and the
unlawful, the possibility of mistaken fact finding--inherent in all litigation-will create the danger
that the legitimate utterance will be penalized." In general, first amendment cases express the
notion that the exercise of those protected rights are presumptively permitted in the absence of
some extremely compelling social reason to limit them. See, e.g., New York Times v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (stating that very strict
standards of statutory vagueness are appropriate when the effect of vagueness may be to inhibit
"the free dissemination of ideas"). Justice Stewart in his dissent in Estes, 381 U.S. at 615, summa-
rized by stating: "The idea of imposing upon any medium of communications the burden of
justifying its presence is contrary to where I had always thought the presumption must lie in the
area of First Amendment freedoms."
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II. REEXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND RESTRAINTS ON
TECHNOLOGICAL ACCESS
Four of the five justices who composed the Estes majority believed
that due process required the exclusion of cameras from criminal tri-
als.' 40 The language of the opinion was broad enough, however, to
support the view that judges should bar cameras even in civil judicial
proceedings. The Estes Court implicitly ratified the flat ban on techno-
logical access embodied in Canon 3A(7).' 4 t Reconsideration at this
time suggests that an outright prohibition of cameras in the courts is
not and probably never was appropriate.
Because Estes is the Supreme Court's primary effort to deal with
news-gathering techniques, as opposed to press access,' 42 a critique of
the opinion should review not only the assumptions made in the opin-
ion, but also its historical setting. Estes was decided when the effects of
mass communications on the criminal justice system preoccupied the
courts and when television commanded the intense and occasionally
hysterical attention of the nation.' 43
Today, the pervasiveness of the mass media has become common-
place. Although the reach of Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,'44 which up-
held the closing of a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence,
remains unclear, the Supreme Court's decision in Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia145 surely means that the vast majority of trials will
be open to the public; whenever the press deems any trial to be of pub-
lic interest, reporters will cover it. Newsworthy trials will be reported
in the daily papers, written about in magazines and books, and dis-
cussed on radio and television-whether or not courts permit reporters
to carry cameras, tape recorders, or broadcast equipment. The issue
posed by Canon 3A(7) and the state canons based upon it is therefore
not whether coverage shall occur, or how much of it there shall be, but
how such coverage shall occur. Cameras and other forms of recording
devices should not be banned merely because they expose trial partici-
pants to publicity; modem press coverage, even subject to the restraints
140. Justices Clark, Warren, Douglas, and Goldberg agreed that criminal trials should never
be televised. 381 U.S. at 540-41. Justice Harlan limited his agreement to those cases involving
notorious defendants. Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring). A question left open by all was whether
a defendant could consent to the presence of the cameras.
141. See id. at 594 (Harlan, J., concurring).
142. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), also could be said to relate
to methods of news-gathering, but because of its peculiar facts should probably be viewed as siui
generis. See note 55 supra.
143. See notes 257-67 infra and accompanying text.
144. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
145. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
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of Canon 3A(7), inevitably does that. Only if they affect the trial in a
manner that is both peculiar and peculiarly harmful should these de-
vices be barred.
The allegedly peculiar and peculiarly harmful attributes of mod-
em media technology 146 fall into five categories. These categories are
interference with the dignity and decorum of the courtroom; prejudicial
publicity; adverse psychological impact on participants in judicial pro-
ceedings; invasion of trial participants' rights of privacy; and objections
to the nature and content of the media. Each of these will be explored
in relation to a specific judicial proceeding, the Estes trial setting.147
Not all of these objections apply to all technologies. Tape record-
ers, radio equipment, or still cameras, for example, may pose different
and lesser potential risks than television cameras.148 Nevertheless, Ca-
non 3A(7) of the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct
lumps these technologies together, and courts often fail to distinguish
their imputed effects. As a matter of convenience, therefore, this Arti-
cle will consider all technologies as a group.
A. Interference with the Dignity and Decorum of the Courtroom.
Opponents of technological access raise two objections concerning
the effect of recording devices on the atmosphere of the courtroom.
The first concern is the risk that the equipment itself and the people
who use it Will overcrowd the court, generate enough noise and confu-
sion to distract the attention of trial participants, and physically ob-
struct and disturb the proceedings with the glare of lights, the whir and
click of cameras, and the movement of camera teams around the room.
146. A number of articles over the years have explored one or more of the claims made by the
proponents of Canon 3A(7) that technological access results in harm to the defendant and the
judicial process. These articles include Boyd, Cameras in Court: Estes v. Texas and Florida's One
Year Pilot Program, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 815 (1978); Doubles, A Camera in the Courtroom, 22
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1965); Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840
(1960); Loewen, Cameras in the Courtroom: A Reconsideration, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 504 (1978);
Silverstein, TV Comes to the Courts, STATE COURT J., Spring 1978, at 14; Comment, The Televised
Trial- A Perspective, 7 Cum. L. REv. 323 (1976). For an excellent bibliography on the subject, see
National Center for State Courts, supra note 21.
147. See note 4 supra; cf Tribe, Trying California's Judges on Television: Open Government or
Judicial Intimidation?, 65 A.B.A.J. 1175 (1979) (similar justification is used when recording equip-
ment is excluded from other governmental functions).
148. The differences among the various technologies are rarely noted by the courts, but a
federal district court in Colorado did distinguish, in denying a habeas petition, between still and
television cameras, finding still cameras to be less intrusive. Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760
(D. Colo.), a7'd, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971). See also Note,
United States v. CBS: Wen Sketch Artists Are Allowed in the Courtroom Can Photographers Be
Far Behind?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 188.
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Estes revealed the media's capacity to disrupt courtroom proceed-
ings. During the pretrial hearings, while defense counsel argued a mo-
tion to exclude cameras, a photographer roaming the court snapped
pictures from behind the judge's bench. Television crews set up six
video cameras in the courtroom; their cables and wires snaked across
the floor in an impenetrable tangle. No one arguing Estes before the
Supreme Court even contended that the unregulated coverage of the
pretrial hearing was anything but disruptive. 49
This kind of noisy and visually distracting activity cannot be per-
mitted in the courtroom for the same reason that trials cannot be con-
ducted in the waiting room of Grand Central Station: the extraneous
activity would make it difficult for the trial participants to hear, to see,
and to concentrate on the immediate business at hand. The trial judge
traditionally has power to control physical disruptions of the court-
room. 50 Regulation of the media that provides for such control does
no more damage to first amendment values than does the exercise of a
judge's authority to prevent spectators from chatting audibly during a
court session. If a still camera, for example, announced its every shot
with a loud click and a blinding flash of light, the resulting interference
with courtroom proceedings would justify barring the camera from the
courtroom altogether.
Prevention of physical disruption, however, was not the rationale
for the majority ruling in Estes. If anything, the case demonstrated
that still photography and television, even at that time, could operate in
a courtroom unobtrusively.' 5' Dismayed by the pretrial disarray
caused by the microphones, wires, cameras, and personnel, the trial
judge instituted stringent rules to govern coverage of the trial. A booth
erected at the rear of the room concealed the cameras, still photogra-
149. 381 U.S. at 536.
150. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2830 n.18 (1980) (judges
have power to preserve the quiet and orderly setting of a trial by imposing reasonable limitations
on access).
151. The point was made a decade earlier when Colorado decided to permit technological
access to its courtrooms. Mr. Justice Moore, whose report recommending the policy was adopted
by the Colorado Supreme Court in 1956, In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956), stated:
At least one hundred photographs were taken at various stages of the hearing which were
printed and introduced as exhibits. All of them were taken without the least disturbance
or interference with the proceedings, and, with one or two exceptions, without any
knowledge on my part that a photograph was being taken. A newsreel camera operated
for half an hour without knowledge on my part that the operation was going on. Radio
microphones were not discovered by me until my attention was specifically directed to
their location. Several hours were devoted to the techniques involved in modern produc-
tion of live telecasts. . . . Only the regular lighting at all times functioning in the court
room was used, and any court room with adequate sunlight for ordinary court proceed-
ings would require no additional lighting.
Id. at 595-96, 296 P.2d at 468.
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phers worked only behind the bar, radio reporters taped the proceed-
ings with a single microphone, and the court prohibited flash bulbs and
flood lights. t52 The Estes majority found the reduced confusion incon-
sequential, however; according to the Court, the mere presence of cam-
eras, microphones, and their operators so intruded on the consciousness
of trial participants that, without more, they prejudiced the rights of the
defendant and offended the essential dignity of the court. 53
In attempting to identify the nature of the offense to the court's
atmosphere, the various opinions suggested two risks: that trials would
be scheduled for the convenience of the press, the way professional
sports are now scheduled to suit the demands of sponsors and the audi-
ence, 154 and that the press would transform trial participants into actors
who would need to be made up for their appearances. 55 This parade
of horribles, which seems in the retelling more fantasy than genuine
threat, was an attempt to articulate the subtler concerns of individuals,
including members of the Court, who profoundly feared the impact of
television and radio upon the judicial system. The fear reflects two
widely shared perceptions: that the atmosphere in which a trial is con-
ducted is a critical component of justice, and that the atmosphere is
uniquely fragile and easily destroyed. Justice Douglas, in other con-
texts one of the Court's most ardent protectors of first amendment free-
doms, 56 argued vigorously against technological "invasion" of the
courts. He feared the destruction of the court as "a quiet place where
the search for truth by earnest, dedicated men goes on in a dignified
atmosphere."' 157 In a refrain picked up and amplified by other mem-
bers of the Estes Court, Douglas compared televised justice to the noto-
rious trials held by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro before an audience of
18,000 in the Havana Stadium. 58 The clear import of the comparison
was that television coverage inevitably converted trials into entertain-
ments, into Roman circuses, 59 with the accompanying risk of mob rule
and anarchy.
152. 381 U.S. at 555-57 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
153. Id. at 546.
154. Id. at 573-74 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
155. Id. at 588 (Harlan, J., concurring).
156. Justice Douglas and Justice Black were the primary proponents of the "absolute" posi-
tion on freedom of speech, arguing that if something is speech within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, it may not be abridged by any law. For expressions of the Douglas view, see, e.g., Time Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 78 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 536-37 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Emerson, supra note 89, at 914-16.
157. Douglas, The Public Trial and the Free Press, 46 A.B.A.J. 840, 841 (1960).
158. Id.; Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 572 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
159. Justice Douglas criticized technological access at one point by quoting Juvenal: "Two
things only the people anxiously desire-bread and circuses." Douglas, supra note 157, at 844.
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While a calm and well-ordered courtroom is a valuable-even es-
sential-attribute of a fair trial, no logical connection can be drawn
between the use of recording equipment and a decline into mob justice.
When the press records and transmits a trial on film, it merely reports
through a different mode an event that would reach a broad audience
by other means anyway. Widespread communication does not in itself
convert defendants into gladiators displayed in a public arena. Hold-
ing the trial in a courtroom before an audience of manageable propor-
tions preserves the critical distance between the mass audience and the
defendant. The accused is thereby screened from the threat of mob
vengeance, irrespective of reporting techniques, at least to the degree
that such insulation is possible in a society that values free speech. A
trial conducted in the presence of a small public audience, with the
press as surrogate for those who cannot attend, does not present a judge
with an uncontrollable situation comparable to trying a case before
thousands in a sports arena. In a traditional courtroom, judges can
easily control hostile or boisterous behavior, whether by the public or
the press.
Once one rejects the analogy to mob trials, the degree of dignity
necessary to the administration of justice becomes a question of taste
and economy. The ideal of serene and decorous proceedings that the
Supreme Court admired in Estes is well beyond the reach of many un-
derfunded and overcrowed state courts. Reviewing tribunals, however,
rarely deem those courts incompetent to dispense justice and adminis-
ter the law. Furthermore, reliance on the dignity of the court as a
touchstone is particularly worrisome when constitutional rights hang in
the balance. Judges and advocates have often been chastised for ad-
vancing their personal preferences in matters of dignity and decorum at
the expense of the openness of the judicial system and its intelligibility
to the public.' 60 In an era of appreciation for the importance of ac-
countability and accessibility in all branches of government, a heavy
reliance on decorum as a ruling principle demands searching judicial
reconsideration.
Most important, scant evidence exists to prove that recording
equipment per se interferes with decorum, and the assumption that it
does has become increasingly questionable in light of the judiciary's
growing reliance on cameras, television receivers, and tape recorders to
preserve a record of the trial and to present the testimony of unavaila-
160. The late Judge Jerome Frank, in a biting and witty critique of the judiciary, described the
phenomenon as part of "the cult of the robe." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 254 (1949). See also
Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 109, at 161; Schmidt, *hy We Haven't Heard the Nixon
Tapes, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Sept.-Oct. 1975, at 53, 54.
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ble witnesses.' 61 Microphones are also familiar sights in many courts
because they are necessary to insure that the voices of attorneys, wit-
nesses, and judges are audible to each other, to the jury, and to the
courtroom spectators.1 62 One must, therefore, view skeptically the ar-
guments for the continued validity of Estes based on assumptions that
the mere presence of communications equipment in a courtroom dis-
rupts the proceedings.
Arguments about the impact of recording equipment on decorum
are particularly troublesome when used to defend the prohibition of
technological access to appellate arguments. Even if some diminution
in decorum were to occur at this stage, the risks to the rights of criminal
defendants or civil litigants would be slight. Unlike the lay-persons
who serve as witnesses and jurors in a trial court, the players in appel-
late proceedings are professionals whom the law presumes are better
equipped than ordinary citizens to withstand pressures from an aroused
public. 163
161. See notes 110-17 supra and accompanying text.
162. Microphones are commonly available, for example, in federal districts courts. For a dis-
cussion of the problems where they are not available, or are unused, see Weinstein & Zimmerman,
supra note 109, at 160. See also Schair, Is an Inaudible Trial a Public Trial?, 60 JUDICATURE 413
(1977).
163. State courts clearly recognize that appellate proceedings present fewer sensitive issues
than do trial courts with regard to technological access. Texas and North Dakota, which currently
prohibit technological access to their trial courts, permit such access to appellate proceedings. A
number of other states experimenting with technological access have chosen to limit such experi-
mentation, at least initially, to appellate courts. Those states include Idaho, Minnesota, and Ten-
nessee. See note 21 supra. See also Memorandum from Jag C. Uppal to Executive Council,
Conference of Chief Justices (Feb. 7, 1979), reprinted in In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc.,
370 So. 2d 764, 786, 790-91 app. (Fla. 1979). It has also been suggested that technological access
to federal appellate courts would be appropriate, see, e.g., Spann, Cameras in the Courtroom-For
Better or For Worse, 64 A.B.A.J. 797 (1978); Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 109, at 162.
But others doubt that such a plan would meet with favor; Professor Benno Schmidt relates the
following story:
[A] network news executive met Chief Justice Earl Warren more than a decade ago, and
told that great man of two of his ambitions. One was to put television cameras on the
moon; and the other was to televise proceedings of the Supreme Court. "You'll get the
former," the Chief Justice is said to have replied, "before you get the latter."
Schmidt, supra note 160, at 54. There is little to suggest that the federal judiciary would be more
amenable to television coverage at the appellate level today. Chief Justice Burger, for example,
refused to allow the electronic media to broadcast his annual State of the Judiciary address to the
American Bar Association although they had covered the event in the past. The resulting contro-
versy ultimately led the Association's Board of Governors to "reaffirm" its policy in favor of
technological access to all general membership meetings. Burger Agrees to Abide by New ABA
Press Policy, 65 A.B.A.J. 681 (1979); The Electronic Hassle, id. 660. Another indication of the
continued reluctance to reconsider any aspect of the federal ban on technological access may be
found in the recent decision of the United States Judicial Conference to reject a proposed rule that
would have allowed photographic and electronic coverage of "ceremonial matters and naturaliza-
tion proceedings," U.S. JUDICIAL CONF., REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS 44 (1976).
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B. Generation of Prejudicial Publicity.
Technological access can bring the first amendment into conflict
with the sixth amendment when a criminal defendant asserts that the
presence of recording equipment threatens his right to trial by an im-
partial jury.1 64 This assertion is most often made when a criminal case
threatens to generate a great deal of publicity. 65 Less frequently do
civil litigants make analogous claims of protection from a warping of
the trial by a deluge of prejudicial publicity, perhaps because civil liti-
gants perceive publicity's risk to life and liberty as less acute. 66 Never-
theless, courts have excluded cameras from civil trials as well. 67
State and federal cases dealing with the potential prejudicial im-
pact of technological access suggest that opponents of cameras and
electronics believe that these devices pose risks that are not merely
greater than those posed by traditional reporting, but that are also
qualitatively different. The American Bar Association's response to
coverage of the Lindbergh kidnapping case168 illustrates this percep-
tion. Contemporaneous accounts show that radio and photographic
coverage of the trial contributed to, but by no means predominantly
caused, the confusion surrounding the trial: spectators, trial partici-
pants, print journalists, and law enforcement agents can be blamed for
most of the improprieties occurring in the case. 69 Yet when the Amer-
ican Bar Association addressed the problems raised by press coverage
164. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 545-57.
165. For cases that exemplify the problem, see, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539 (1976); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966);
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965). See generally Younger, Some Thoughts on the Defense of
Publici y Cases, 29 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1977).
166. See, e.g., In re Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Marbach, 66 A.D.2d 335, 413
N.Y.S.2d 411 (1979) (the press was barred from attending depositions or receiving transcripts of
depositions prior to the trial in a case involving a controversial religious group, because the court
feared that prejudicial publicity would interfere with the due process rights of the parties); cf
United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (court comment on the poten-
tial problems of prejudice in a denaturalization proceeding involving a former Nazi), rev'd, 597
F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 1013 (1980) (No. 79-5602).
167. Prejudice was a potential claim in one recent Florida civil case, Gellert v. Eastern Air
Lines, Inc., 370 So. 2d 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), an action for defamation and harassment
allegedly directed by Eastern against one of its pilots who had complained to the National Trans-
portation Safety Board and others about safety hazards aboard Eastern's aircraft. The airline
moved for a new trial on several grounds, including juror prejudice. A film clip from the trial was
shown on television, coupled with a clip of scenes from an Eastern crash in the Everglades in 1972
in which 100 persons were killed. The airline had some reason to believe that the publicity might
have affected the jury decision to return a $1.6 million verdict against it. Ultimately, the verdict
was set aside by the court on other grounds. Telephone interview with William G. Bell, Jr., Senior
Vice President for Legal Affairs, Eastern Air Lines, in Miami, Fla. (Dec. 11, 1979).
168. See generally Kielbowicz, supra note 127.
169. Id. 19-20. See also Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 548-49 (1976) (discuss-
ing the trial of Bruno Hauptmann for the Lindbergh kidnapping); S. WHIPPLE, THE TRIAL OF
BRUNO RICHARD HAUPTMANN 46-49 (1937).
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of the Lindbergh case, it concerned itself solely with broadcast and
photographic coverage. 70 This concern led to the adoption of what is
now Canon 3A(7); 17 1 largely because of the impact of this canon, major
disputes over press recordation of trials in the next three decades were
rare. 172
During the 1960s, however, with the growing importance of televi-
sion journalism, a number of prejudicial publicity cases involving
broadcast media came before the United States Supreme Court. The
first, decided prior to Estes, gave voice to the suspicion that broadcast
publicity held unique potential for prejudice. In Rideau v. Louisiana173
a sheriff had brought a murder suspect to a press conference at which
the suspect confessed his guilt before reporters and television cameras.
Videotapes of his confession appeared on news programs and were
viewed widely in the parish. The trial judge failed to use any of the
normal curative devices designed to prevent pretrial publicity from in-
fecting the jury's deliberations. 74 The Supreme Court held that the
televised confession presumptively violated Rideau's sixth amendment
rights, even though Rideau could not demonstrate precisely how the
publicity influenced his conviction. Although the Rideau Court did not
so state, it is difficult to believe that the defendant's claim of presump-
tive prejudice would have been weaker had the print press alone cov-
ered his confession and then saturated the community with reports of it
in local newspapers. 75
When the Court decided Estes, however, it ignored the factual set-
ting of Rideau and instead relied uncritically upon the earlier case to
support the proposition that television and radio contaminate the crim-
inal justice system in a unique and incurable way. 176 The Court thus
interpreted Rideau, a case born of a peculiar combination of errors by
the court and by law enforcement officials, as evidence of the general
170. See 62 A.B.A. REP. 767 (1937). Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, the predeces-
sor to Canon 3A(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, was amended in 1952 to prohibit telecasting
in addition to photography and broadcasting. 77 A.B.A. REP. 110-1 1, 257, 429-30, 607-11 (1952).
171. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3A(7).
172. By the time Estes was decided in 1965, all but two states-Texas and Colorado-had
adopted what was then ABA Canon 35, thereby prohibiting television in the courtroom. 381 U.S.
at 544.
173. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
174. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
175. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (documenting intense print press coverage
at a trial). In Sheppard, the Supreme Court found the coverage so excessive as to prejudice irre-
mediably the defendant's trial. Although the case involved television and radio coverage, as wel
as newspaper coverage, the record in the Court contained only newspaper clippings.
176. 381 U.S. at 543-44.
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perniciousness of the broadcast industry. The Court presumed that Es-
tes, like Rideau, was a victim of prejudice because the press used televi-
sion cameras and microphones to cover his pretrial hearing and some
portions of the trial itself. The Court did not require Estes to demon-
strate any specific injury. It attached no weight to the fact that the
televised pretrial proceeding in Estes was concerned with whether the
court would permit cameras and broadcast equipment in the courtroom
during the trial-not with matters bearing on guilt or innocence. 177
Nor did the Court deem it relevant that under Texas law the jurors
would be sequestered. 78
Some of the force of Rideau and Estes has been blunted because
the Supreme Court has revised its views on prejudicial publicity. After
a decade of struggling with defendants' claims of presumptive
prejudice from massive press attention by one or more of the media, 179
the Court in Murphy v. Florida'80 announced a stricter standard for
measuring press prejudice. The Court held that a defendant's sixth
amendment rights were not violated simply because some members of
the jury knew of the defendant's exploits and prior record before the
trial began.' 8' Nor was juror awareness of the trial's notoriety enough
to trigger a finding of presumptive prejudice. 82 Had the Court failed
to make this accommodation, a well-known or widely publicized de-
fendant like Murphy would be virtually immune from conviction. 183
After Murphy a number of cases arose in which television public-
ity was an important factor in claims of prejudice. The government
prosecuted several former White House aides to President Richard M.
Nixon for their alleged roles in the 1972 Watergate conspiracy; their
indictments stemmed from testimony before a Senate committee that
177. Id. at 535-36.
178. Id. at 546.
179. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
180. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
181. One reason jurors had such information was that defense counsel, during the voir dire,
pointed out numerous details about Murphy's past, including a recent murder conviction. Id. at
800 n.3. In addition to the information supplied during voir dire, and to evidence that jurors
actually did harbor negative feelings toward a convicted felon like Murphy, the judge failed to
instruct the jurors not to discuss the case among themselves, id. at 807 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and apparently took no other steps to insulate the jury from the publicity surrounding the case.
.d.
182. Id. at 800.
183. Despite the apparent complicity of the court and counsel in adding to the knowledge of
the jurors about Murphy's past, the amount of pretrial publicity he generated would, in itself,
probably have insured at least some "tainting" of the jury with extrajudicial prejudicial informa-
tion. Murphy captured national attention for his role in the 1964 theft of the Star of India sap-
phire from the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. Id. at 795.
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millions viewed on nationwide television. Had television truly been
"unique" in its prejudicial effects, a fair trial of these defendants would
have been impossible. Yet the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia rejected the claims of the convicted Watergate conspirators that
the pretrial publicity prejudiced their trial. 84
Television may communicate a different spectrum of information
than the print media. 8 5 The power to convey a unique message, how-
ever, does not render television uniquely prejudicial. No evidence sup-
ports the assumption that the mode by which one transmits information
influences the degree of prejudice. No one has gathered scientific data
that proves, or even suggests, that broadcast or photographic media are
in this regard suigeneris and distinguishable from the print media.1 86
The danger of press prejudice arises from the press's capacity to create
an impression of guilt or innocence in advance of trial. The print me-
dia are no less adept at this than the broadcast media.' 87
During the trial itself, massive publicity, whatever the source, can
create two difficulties for the defendant. First, publicity about the trial
creates a risk that jurors will be influenced in their decision by expo-
sure, from newspapers, magazines, radio, and television, to information
184. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 59-71 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933
(1977). People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
986 (1977), is another case in which overwhelming publicity, via television as well as the print
press, was found not to have interfered with the fairness of the trial. The court relied on Murphy
v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) in reaching its conclusion, 61 Cal. App. 3d at 185, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
315.
185. See notes 100-05 supra and accompanying text.
186. The Supreme Court in Estes, 381 U.S. at 545, did not cite any authority for the proposi-
tion that television's presence in the courtroom "will have a direct bearing on [a juror's] vote as to
guilt or innocence." The years since Estes have not supplied the empirical support that was miss-
ing at the time of the decision. While television is reportedly the medium upon which most people
depend for news, and which they deem most credible, G. COMSTOCK, S. CHAFFEE, N. KATZMAN,
M. McCoMBs, & D. ROBERTS, TELEVISION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 9 (1978), it does not necessar-
ily have unique power in comparison with other media in creating attitudes and beliefs. Prelimi-
nary research suggests that although television serves an "agenda-setting" function for the public,
it does not influence how people think about things so much as what things they think about. id.
315. Furthermore, all media are thought to be agenda-setters, and television may be less effective
at it than are newspapers, at least with regard to certain types of political behavior. Id. 323-25.
See K. LANG & G. LANG, POLITICS AND TELEVISION (1968):
No one has yet been able to "demonstrate" through a convincing experiment what the
long-range effects of television have been. Nor are they likely to. To trace a change in a
political climate or a realignment within the electorate straight to the door of television is
a task foredoomed to failure.
Id. 309-10. The Langs believe there may be "small incremental changes" in attitude, cumulative
in effect, that can be attributed to the influence of television, but surely this must also be true of
other modes of mass communication.
187. See note 175 supra.
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about the case that has been ruled inadmissible. Second, should a re-
trial be necessary, publicity can make it more difficult to find another
impartial jury.
Most cases attract so little press attention that neither of these
problems ever occurs. The recognition of a right of technological ac-
cess will not make publicity cases more common, because such cases
result from their intrinsic interest to the public, not from the mode of
coverage. When the rare "publicity" case does occur, and media of all
types cover it, there is no support for the assumption that actual footage
of the trial will influence audiences in a way that merely hearing about
the case, seeing sketches of it in the newspapers and on television, and
reading detailed accounts of it would not.188 It is hard to imagine, for
example, that live television coverage of Patricia Hearst's trial 89 would
have exacerbated the problems of empaneling a set of impartial jurors
for a retrial, if one had been needed. 90 The criminal justice system, in
an age of rapid mass communication, must rely on change of venue,
postponements, the basic ability of jurors to be fair-minded, and prob-
ing voir dire to cure the effects of publicity.
The risk that jurors will be exposed to prejudicial information dur-
ing the trial is present whenever a trial attracts sufficient public interest
to merit press coverage. The assumption that jurors actually heed the
judge's admonitions against reading newspapers or listening to radio or
television news during a trial is fundamental to our system of justice. 191
When the risks of exposure are too great to rely merely on admonitions,
juries can also be sequestered.
188. Much of what is written about the influence of television on viewers seems to apply
equally to other mass media. One author states: "While the focus [of this book] is on TV news, it
will be clear that many of the points I make can also be applied to print journalism." D. AL-
THEIDE, CREATING REALITY: How TV NEWS DISTORTS EvENTS 9 (1974). The Langs also make
frequent observations which are equally valid for all media. See K. LANG & G. LANG, supra note
186, at 150, 290.
189. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 8. Ms. Hearst was tried and convicted for
her participation in crimes committed as a member of the Symbionese Liberation Army, the radi-
cal group that earlier had kidnapped her.
190. One sense in which technological access might make it more difficult to empanel a new
jury would be that television is thought to reach a wider audience than newspapers, thereby de-
creasing the pool of "unaware" jurors. G. COMSTOCK ET AL., supra note 186, at 8. Courts, how-
ever, have never regulated press coverage of events based on the size of the medium's circulation;
to do so would be to penalize speech based on its effectiveness in reaching hearers, a policy surely
inimical to first amendment values.
191. Exposure to press publicity is a risk not only with regard to jurors but also with respect to
witnesses barred from the courtroom during testimony by others. The problems involved in keep-
ing witnesses from viewing news about the trial are little different from those posed in keeping
such publicity from jurors, and are unlikely to be aggravated by the presence of cameras and
recording devices. But see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 547.
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Recognition of a right of technological access might increase the
coverage of noteworthy trials, because broadcasters, able to present
news about trials more effectively, might be willing to devote more air
time to it. And because many people rely primarily on television for
their news, 92 an increase in coverage might expose more people to
such information. But the Supreme Court has never suggested that the
government can control press coverage based on how effectively the
media disseminate information. Consistent with the purpose of the first
amendment, the press should not be regulated in proportion to the vol-
ume of news conveyed or the size of the audience reached. The in-
creased coverage that technological access might bring is not a
constitutionally sound basis for denying it.193
Permitting cameras in courtrooms might create one risk that does
not exist when recording equipment is barred: jurors might succumb to
the temptation to see their photographs in newspapers or on television.
The State of Florida explored this possibility informally in a question-
naire distributed to jurors who served during that state's preliminary
experiment with televised trials. Their responses suggested that most
jurors experienced little or no curiosity. 194 Apparently most of the
states now experimenting with or permitting photography and broad-
casting in their courts have not considered this possibility a significant
threat; virtually all such states either place no restrictions whatever on
photography of jurors or restrict such photography only if the juror
objects.195
192. See, e.g., G. COMSTOCK ET AL., supra note 186, at 8-9; M. GREEN, TELEVISION NEWS:
ANATOMY AND PROCESS 7 (1969). For a general exploration of the rising importance of television
news, see H. LAND Assocs., TELEVISION AND THE WIRED CITY (1968). Radio, like television, is
an important source of news and information. Radio today is thought to reach a wider audience
than any other medium; it is estimated that the average American household now contains five
radio sets. Waters, Sounds of Success, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 1979, at 132.
193. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
100 S. Ct. 2814, 2825 (1980), implied that the first amendment protects the ability to reach a wide
and varied audience when he wrote:
Instead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word of
mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print and
electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as surrogates
for the public. While media representatives enjoy the same right of access as the public,
they often are provided special seating and priority of entry so that they may report what
people in attendance have seen and heard. This "contribute[s] to public understanding
of the rule of law and to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice
system ...." Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587. . .(BRENNAN, J.,
concurring).
194. The Florida Supreme Court summarized the results of the survey: "The degree to which
jurors and witnesses felt the urge to see or hear themselves on the media fell between not at all and
slightly." In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 769 (Fla. 1979).
195. Of the states whose temporary or permanent rules on technological access place any re-
strictions on photography of jurors, most follow a model permitting such coverage unless jurors
refuse to be photographed. See, e.g., Alaska: Canon 3A(7)(c)(iv), In re Canon 3A(7)(c), 5 Media
L. Rep. 2494 (Alaska 1979); Oklahoma: Code of Judicial Condu~t, Revised Canon 3A(7) (Oct.
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One might also argue that jurors who see cameras in the court-
room may be influenced in their deliberations because the cameras
make them aware that the case is unusually important or that the de-
fendant is particularly notorious.' 96 Murphy v. Florida97 suggests that
awareness of such matters is constitutionally insignificant. Further-
more, the absence of cameras from the courtroom will not prevent the
problem. Even without photographers and recording equipment any-
where in sight, jurors will be put on notice that a case is important once
they see reporters with notebooks, artists with sketch pads and drawing
boards, and large numbers of spectators filling up the available seats.
In sum, a right to record trials photographically and electronically
will not create problems of intrusive publicity different from those
caused by existing media coverage. In a publicity case, the increment
of additional publicity that may result from permitting photographs
and tapes to be made in court neither justifies a regulation of the press,
nor changes the nature of the risks that publicity poses to the defend-
ant's rights, nor alters the responsibility of the judge to protect the fair-
ness of a trial. With or without the presence of modem journalistic
technology, judges trying highly publicized cases must face the problem
of shaping adequate protective orders, controlling the actions of court
and law enforcement personnel, and deciding whether to use tech-
niques such as sequestration of jurors or change of venue. Expanding
the possible methods through which the press reports a trial to the pub-
lic would place no additional or unique burdens on a court.
C. Adverse Psychological Impact on Particiants in Judicial
Proceedings.
The Supreme Court, some states, and many members of the bar
have presumed that the presence of television cameras in the courtroom
corrupts the process of justice simply because persons inside the court-
room have an "awareness that they are being televised."'' 98 This disa-
bility, it is said, attaches even though the cameras are unobtrusively
25, 1978); Washington: Code of Judicial Conduct 3A(7) (effective Sept. 20, 1976). Wisconsin's
general prohibition on photographing jurors is unusual. See Wisconsin Supreme Court Order, In
re- The Code of Judicial Ethics (June 21, 1979).
196. "[Tjhere are numerous situations in which televising court proceedings can cause an un-
fair trial. . . such as. . .improperly influencing jurors by emphasizing the notoriety of the trial
and affecting their impartial judgment. ... Callahan v. Lash, 381 F. Supp. 827, 833 (N.D. Ind.
1974) (granting a writ of habeas corpus because the trial was infected with numerous errors, in-
cluding the admission of television cameras to court). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 545.
197. 421 U.S. 794 (1975).
198. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 545. See generally Doubles, slipra note 146 (supporting a
prohibition against technological access on privacy and psychological grounds).
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placed and are operated without distracting noises or disruptive physi-
cal movement.' 99 According to this theory, cameras make jurors and
witnesses uncomfortable and self-conscious, 200 tempt attorneys and
judges into dramatic excesses or on-camera electioneering,20' and force
criminal defendants to undergo an experience comparable to the third
degree, disabling many of them so that they can no longer adequately
participate in their own defenses. 202 Such psychological disturbances,
if real, would impair a criminal defendant's sixth amendment rights,
and might seriously impede justice in civil cases as well.
If these effects were truly as common and as severe as alleged, not
even the recognition of first amendment protection for the means of
news-gathering would win a place for cameras in the courtroom. In a
balancing test, the need to prevent a significant impairment of the con-
stitutional right to a fair trial would prevail over the right to technologi-
cal access, because such impairment would conffict with the most basic
notions of due process. Evidence that these damaging disruptions actu-
ally occur, however, is at best quite speculative. Although Estes asserts
that television, even when unobtrusive, is psychologically subversive,
and that this is "common knowledge," the opinion cites no scientific
data or studies for support.20 3
The small body of experience with technological access prior to
the Estes decision actually supported the opposite conclusion.20 4 In
199. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 546:
The State argues that [the effect on the jury] is deminimis since the physical disturbances
have been eliminated. But we know that distractions are not caused solely by the physi-
cal presence of the camera and its telltale red lights. It is the awareness of the fact of
telecasting that is felt by the juror throughout the trial. We are all self-conscious and
uneasy when being televised.
200. Id. at 546, 547.
201. Id. at 546-49 (judges); id. at 579 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (lawyers).
202. Id. at 549.
203. Justice Clark, who wrote the majority opinion in Estes, referred several times to adverse
psychological consequences of permitting television to film trials, 381 U.S. at 546, 547-48, 549,
without citing any supporting scientific or empirical data. Chief Justice Warren, who also dis-
cussed the psychological impact of television in his concurrence and who characterized that infor-
mation as a matter of "common knowledge," cited newspaper articles, law review and bar
association journal articles, and one lower court opinion, but no studies. Id. at 568-70. All the
sources relied on by the Chief Justice were impressionistic writings.
204. Claims of prejudice from television, radio, or still photography were raised on numerous
occasions before Estes, but were almost always defeated, even when the reviewing court expressed
unhappiness as a matter of policy with the presence of such technology. The courts in each case
were looking for evidence of actual effects on the trial, as opposed to applying the "presumed
prejudice" rule enunciated in Estes, and were able to find none. See People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d
615, 226 P.2d 330 (1951) (no reversible error despite an "improper" permission to photograph and
televise), ajd sub nom. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) (no claim of prejudice from
coverage of the trial itself); Hudson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 192, 132 S.E.2d 508 (1963) (conviction
reversed not because of the trial broadcast, which comports with the first amendment, but because
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Oklahoma, for instance, a defendant sought reversal of a conviction for
burglary because of the psychological impact of television on his
trial.20 5 Affirming the conviction, the appellate court noted the total
absence of evidence of such an impact and therefore criticized the ear-
lier version of American Bar Association Canon 3A(7): "This conten-
tion presents itself as a baseless boogey constructed out of pure
conjecture. We are of the opinion that the presumption upon which
Canon 35 has been constructed is fabricated out of sheer implication
and not hammered out on the anvil of experience. '20 6
Colorado, too, failed to find evidence that television or still pho-
tography caused any psychological disturbance. Justice Moore of the
Colorado Supreme Court, who in 1956 refereed hearings on whether
the state should reject Canon 35, reported that with one or two excep-
tions, he was not even conscious of the still, newsreel, and television
cameras, or of the radio microphones, that were used to cover the
of the placement of a microphone too close to the defendant and his counsel); Bisignano v. Munic-
ipal Court, 237 Iowa 895, 23 N.W.2d 523 (1946) (the court disapproved of the radio broadcast of
contempt proceedings, but held that the defendant was not prejudiced); State v. Cox, 188 Kan.
500, 363 P.2d 528 (1961) (a radio broadcast of pretrial proceedings, while disapproved, was not
reversible error); State v. Langley, 214 Or. 445, 323 P.2d 301 (1958) (the use by the press of movie
and still cameras in court was not reversible error). But see People v. Ulrich, 376 Ill. 461, 34
N.E.2d 393 (1941) (reversing a conviction for inadequate proof and reinforcing that decision by
disapproving of the use of still cameras in the court). Interestingly, two of the most notorious
trials at which cameras and broadcast equipment were used were that of Bruno Hauptmann, kid-
napper of the son of Charles A. Lindbergh, and that of a Colorado man who, in order to murder
his mother, blew up a commercial airliner. In neither appeal were the cameras and microphones
identified as giving rise to special problems of prejudice. Graham v. People, 134 Colo. 290, 302
P.2d 737 (1956) (no claim of prejudicial publicity raised); State v. Hauptmann, 115 N.J.L. 412, 180
A. 809 (in affirming the conviction, the court does not mention the use of radio microphones or
newsreel cameras in the courtroom), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935). The strongest language
opposing technological access is found not in criminal appeals, but in contempt actions against the
press for violating court orders against the taking of photographs. See Brumfield v. State, 108 So.
2d 33 (Fla. 1958); Exparte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927); State v. Clifford, 162 Ohio St.
370, 123 N.E.2d 8 (1954). Interestingly, in Brumfield the Florida court stressed that the taking of
photographs did not "cause inordinate disturbance or indignities," 108 So. 2d at 34-35. In Ex
parte Stur, photographs were taken in court so unobtrusively-but secretly and in violation of a
court order--that the judge was not aware of them until two were run in a local newspaper, 152
Md. at 117, 136 A. at 313 (1927). In another case, In re Greenfield, 163 N.E.2d 910 (Ohio Ct. App.
1959), the contempt conviction of a photographer for taking pictures of the trial through a window
in the courtroom door was reversed because the court found no interference with the administra-
tion of justice as a result of Greenfield's activities: "If there was any obstruction of justice by
anyone, it was the court bailiff who 'called to the court's attention' the taking of pictures through a
window of the closed door. . . .The record does not show that the court was disturbed by this
act until notified by the bailiff." 163 N.E.2d at 912.
205. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
206. Id. at 742. The court referred, in support of the assessment, to its own experience with
televised proceedings.
[Vol. 1980:641
0 VERCOMING FUTURE SHOCK
proceedings. 207 While long exposure to the public may have condi-
tioned Justice Moore to these devices, later experience in Colorado
courtrooms suggested that others less accustomed to public exposure
were similarly immune. The first trial televised in Colorado after the
state court rejected Canon 35 was a celebrated murder case in which
the state accused the defendant of concealing a bomb aboard an air-
liner.20 8 Subsequent interviews with participants and with the defend-
ant's widow209 revealed that once the trial began, no one-from judge
to jury-was conscious of the cameras that recorded the events in the
courtroom.21 0
Since Estes, no one has gathered authoritative evidence to support
the Court's assumption that disruptive emotional effects result from tel-
evising trials.2t t Most sociological and psychological research to date
has addressed the effects of the mass media on the audience rather than
on the subjects of coverage themselves.212 One research team reported
207. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591,
595, 296 P.2d 465, 468 (1956).
208. Graham v. People, 134 Colo. 290, 302 P.2d 737 (1956).
209. Graham, the defendant, had been executed before the interview with his wife took place.
Broadcasting in the Courtroom, BROADCASTING, May 13, 1957, at 136.
210. Id. The foreman of the jury stated in the interview that he forgot about the television
cameras once the trial began. He observed of others in the case: "I imagine that [the witnesses]
would be just a little nervous anyhow, but I do not believe the attorneys, the defendant, or anyone
else was conscious that the cameras were there." Id. 140.
211. The strongest indication that a factual basis for Estes has been found wanting is the
current trend among the states to reject the ABA position and to modify Canon 3A(7) to permit
electronic and film coverage by the media. See note 21 supra. In addition, the few cases since
1965 in which technological coverage was alleged to have prejudiced the defendant have generally
been decided against the defendant. The first of the highly publicized criminal trials to be tele-
vised in Florida after it began its modem experiment was that of Ronny A. Zamora for murder.
He was convicted, and on appeal did not even raise any claims based on the presence of cameras
in the court. Zamora v. State, 361 So. 2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 372 So. 2d
472 (Fla. 1979). See Bradley v. State, 470 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1972) (although the court expressed
disapproval, it refused to overturn a denial of a writ of habeas corpus and the finding of the
district court that still and television cameras did not prejudice the Colorado defendant in a state
court criminal trial); Bell v. Patterson, 279 F. Supp. 760 (D. Colo.) (the televising of a verdict has
no impact on due process), aj'd, 402 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 955 (1971);
Gonzales v. People, 165 Colo. 322, 438 P.2d 686 (1968) (the court found no impact from a televi-
sion camera in the courtroom and no unusual publicity surrounded the trial); f United States v.
CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1974) (sketching in court did not affect the participants); In re
NBC, 64 N.J. 476, 317 A.2d 695 (1974) (the court accepted the claim of the petitioners that the
sketching of trials would not distract or influence witnesses or jurors); State v. Wampler, 30 Or.
App. 931, 569 P.2d 46 (1977) (the presence of television and lights in the hall outside the court-
room did not distract the jury or damage the defendant's rights), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 960 (1978).
But see Callahan v. Lash, 381 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (a writ of habeas corpus issued
because there were numerous sources of prejudice, including the presence of television and flash
cameras).




that television cameras could be used to create in individuals a state of
"objective self-awareness": a greater consciousness of self than of envi-
ronment.213 Subsequent studies suggest, however, that this state of
acute self-consciousness wears off quickly, either because subjects find
it too uncomfortable to sustain or because they adjust to it rapidly. 214
Furthermore, the research does not suggest that only cameras instill
self-consciousness; observation by a live audience of strangers may pro-
duce similar effects. 215
Florida's informal study of how participants reacted to televised
trials showed that witnesses and jurors knew of the camera's presence,
but responded to that awareness with only slight self-consciousness. 21 6
This self-consciousness, moreover, did not decrease the jurors' concen-
tration on the trial; several jurors commented that their awareness of
the cameras actually increased their sense of responsibility.217
The most thorough attempt to assess the psychological impact of
cameras on trial participants comes from California, which elaborately
evaluated the extent to which the courts could use videotape to improve
the criminal justice system.218 The state studied the reactions to video-
taping of witnesses at depositions and at pretrial hearings. 219 The study
failed to demonstrate that the camera caused any psychological stress.
One-third of the witnesses in the study reported nervousness or discom-
fort, but they attributed these feelings largely to the behavior of the
examining attorney or the presence of the defendant in the court-
room. 220 There was no evidence that witnesses were reluctant to
213. See generaly S. DUVAL & R. WICKLUND, A THEORY OF OBJECTIVE SELF-AWARENESS
(1972); Davis & Brock, Use ofFirst Person Pronouns as a Function ofObjective Se/-Awareness and
Performance Feedback, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 381 (1975).
214. S. DUVAL & R. WICKLUND, supra note 213, at 23-24. The article by Davis & Brock,
spra note 213, at 386-87, suggests that positive feedback may prolong the state of self-awareness
in a subject by making the experience pleasant. This study does not address the suggestion, how-
ever, that adjustment ordinarily occurs fairly quickly.
215. Mirrors and tape recordings of the subject's own voice have been used to induce the state
by experimenters. See Davis & Brock, supra note 213, at 381-82.
216. The Florida Supreme Court reports that awareness of the cameras ranged from slight to
moderate; respondents reported they felt "slightly self-conscious" in the camera's presence but
were unaffected in their ability to participate effectively in the proceedings. In re Post-Newsweek
Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 768 (Fla. 1979).
217. "Both jurors and witnesses perceived that the presence of electronic media made them
feel just slightly more responsible for their actions." Id. The survey also found that some respon-
dents believed themselves "slightly . . . more attentive" in the presence of the cameras. Id.
218. ERNEST H. SHORT & Assocs., INC., supra note 114.
219. Id. 27-41.
220. Id. 28-29:
During the second phase of this research, witnesses were asked, "When you gave your
testimony, was there anything in particular that made you nervous or bothered you in
any way?" While over 35 percent of the witnesses sampled answered yes to this question,
when asked to explain, none of the witnessess attributed their nervousness to the video-
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participate in videotaped proceedings, or that they had a negative atti-
tude toward them.221
The researchers ultimately concluded:
It is entirely possible that videotape recording produces stresses that
are either so small as to be undetectable or so short lived as to be
immeasurable .... [A]lthough witnesses may be aware of the pres-
ence of the videotape apparatus, this awareness is of little conse-
quence when compared with the pressures and demands made upon
witnesses as part of the normal testimony process. 222
Stress at the levels noted by the California research-nonexistent or too
trivial to measure-hardly constitutes a sixth amendment violation or
provides a sufficient state interest to limit a first amendment right. The
conclusions of the California study corroborate the experience of courts
like Florida's, in which the press, rather than the court, operated video-
tape recorders without distracting the participants from the trial.223
Although the author found no evidence directly on the point, there
is little reason to predict that televised trials would disproportionately
distress defendants in a criminal case. Little is known about the psy-
chological effects of cameras on unwillingly televised defendants be-
cause many states require the defendant's consent prior to televising his
trial.224 By extrapolation from what is known about jurors and
tape recording. The two most frequently mentioned causes of nervousness were the be-




223. See note 216 supra. Further reinforcement may be found in the fact that television re-
porters have covered many solemn and important events outside of courtrooms without causing
disruptions. For a discussion of events other than trials that have been televised without incident
in recent years, see CONG. RESEARCH SERV. FOR JOINT COMM. ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS,
93 CONG., 2D SESS., CONGRESS AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
44-47 (Comm. Print 1974); N. MINNOW, J. MARTIN, & L. MITCHELL, PRESIDENTIAL TELEVISION
17-68 (1973).
224. The requirement of prior consent is responsive to the comment in Estes that Estes op-
posed the presence of television, still cameras, and radio at his trial and that his consent might
have erased the due process violation, 381 U.S. at 535. As a result, many states require the de-
fendant's consent to be obtained before they will permit technological access to a trial. See, e.g.,
Alabama: Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3A(7)(A), 3A(7)(B); Georgia: Code of Judicial Con-
duct, Canon 3A(8); Oklahoma: Code of Judicial Conduct, Revised Canon 3A(7). Colorado,
which continued to permit televised trials after Estes, revised its rule to require prior consent by
the accused. Cal. Assembly Interim Comm. on Judiciary, Report of the Subcomm. on Free
Press-Fair Trial, 23 Assembly Interim Comm. Rep. 13 (1965-66) (remarks of Justice Moore,
Colorado Supreme Court); Colorado, Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3A(8)-(10). One of the
few states to dispense with the requirement that the defendant agree to pictorial or broadcast
coverage is Florida. See Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (effective May 1, 1979). Other
states that have dispensed with the prior consent of the defendant include Montana (Canons of
Judicial Ethics, Revised Canon 35 (effective April 1, 1978) (two-year experiment)); New Hamp-
shire (Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7), and Superior Court Rule 78(a) (effective Jan. 1,
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witnesses, however, it seems likely that the addition of cameras and
recorders would not significantly increase the defendant's psychological
burden. A person accused of a crime, confronting the possible loss of
freedom, facing hostile or damaging witnesses, and enduring the scru-
tiny or censure of family, friends, the press, and strangers, is under con-
siderable stress; the accused is unlikely to find that unobtrusive cameras
or microphones noticeably increase the stress.
Experience has also failed to show that the presence of cameras
and microphones induces attorneys and judges to abandon decorum
and play to their unseen audience. States that have televised trials re-
port no such problem.225 Some commentators, reviewing the effect of
television on a reasonably comparable group-state legislators-deter-
mined that the presence of the cameras actually increased the dignity of
their behavior.226 Reports suggest that legislators prepare more care-
fully for debates and hearings when they know they will be publicly
scrutinized; in one state, legislators stopped eating lunch and reading
newspapers in the chamber.227
In any case, courts should not restrict the press merely because
some judges and attorneys misbehave before cameras. As Justice
Moore tartly observed in rejecting the proscriptions of Canon 35 in
Colorado, "a constitutional right of all citizens cannot be denied be-
cause a very few persons may conceivably make fools of themselves
before a larger audience than that which might otherwise be subjected
to their offensive conduct. '228 The legal profession must develop ap-
propriate standards for controlling courtroom behavior. The press and
the public should not be penalized for the profession's failure to do so.
D. Invasion of Trial Particoants' Rights of Privacy.
Judges and attorneys, deeply conscious of the personal distress and
embarrassment experienced by many who come unwillingly before the
courts, are understandably concerned with protecting these individuals'
interest in privacy. Courts have sought to afford such protection by
preventing technological access, thereby restricting publicity. Although
1978)), and New Jersey (New Jersey Supreme Court Order (Mar. 15, 1979) (establishing trial
period for the experimental use of cameras and broadcast coverage of trials)).
225. See In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 775-76 (Fla. 1979); Cal.
Assembly Interim Comm., supra note 224, at 13 (remarks of Justice Moore, Colorado Supreme
Court).
226. See generally TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, supra note 27, at 73-87; In re
Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla. 1979). For a contrary view, see
Smile, You're On. . ., 65 A.B.A.J. 1168 (1979) (reporting that House Speaker Thomas O'Neill
(D. Mass.) believes television has slowed proceedings by encouraging members of Congress to talk
more).
227. See In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 780 (Fla. 1979).
228. In re Hearings Concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132 Colo. 591,
599, 296 P.2d 465, 470 (1956).
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the press and public traditionally have been allowed to attend all but
the rare trial,229 courts have used privacy to justify excluding the re-
porters' recording paraphernalia. 230 Although tape recorders and mi-
crophones have some capacity to create privacy problems, the primary
concern has focused on still, movie, and video cameras. Pictures, critics
reason, may make a juror or a defendant recognizable to strangers on
the street, in contrast to mere verbal or written reports which do not
pose the same risk. As a result, participants in trials may find them-
selves subjected to harassment or embarrassment. 231
Certainly, publication or broadcast of pictures taken in court may
increase public recognition; but protection of privacy is neither practi-
cally nor legally a justification for barring cameras from the courtroom.
On the practical side, the ban on cameras, by necessity limited to the
courtroom and its immediate surroundings, does not prevent aggressive
reporters from getting the'pictures they want.232 Defendants, witnesses,
and even jurors are frequently photographed on the public streets
outside the courthouse as they enter and leave, negating the usefulness
of proscriptions against technological access to prevent the most serious
cases of intimidation. 233
229. Even in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 435 U.S. 368 (1979), permitting the exclusion of the
public and press from pretrial hearings in criminal cases, the United States Supreme Court em-
phasized strongly the long and firm common law tradition of open courts that exists in the United
States and England. Some types of trials may be closed as a matter of public policy, but these are
exceptional. Typical examples include juvenile proceedings and adoptions, English v. McCrary,
348 So. 2d 293, 301 & n.10 (Fla. 1977); see Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 109, at 158-60 &
nn. 11-17. But see Lexington Herald Leader v. Tackett, 49 U.S.L.W. 2041 (Ky. June 24, 1980)
(improper for trial court to close the courtroom during testimony of ten children who were sod-
omy victims); State ex rel. Oregonian Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23 (Or. 1980) (state law
that excludes the press and public froni juvenile courts unless the child or the parents request a
public proceeding violates the state constitution).
230. See Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486, 494-95 (W.D. Pa. 1957)
(the court denied the newspaper an injunction against the enforcement of a state court rule ban-
ning photographs in court and environs, partially on the grounds that the state must protect the
privacy of defendants); Exparie Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 118, 136 A. 312, 314 (1927) (the court af-
firmed the contempt convictions of photographers who took pictures of a defendant in a court-
house and courtroom, in part to protect a defendant's privacy interest); In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251,
259, 126 A.2d 679, 683 (1956) (the court recognized the duty of courts to protect the privacy of
criminal defendants against unwanted photographs), ceri. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
231. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 546. The problem of protecting jurors from harassment is not
unique, of course, to cases that are televised or photographed. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes,
604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (approving the trial court's decision to protect the anonymity ofjurors
in a narcotics case by refusing to make public their names and addresses), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct.
1833 (1980).
232. Moreover, any person motivated to harm or harass a trial participant can go to court
personally to identify his target. See, e.g., United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1833 (1980).
233. Courts generally accept the right of the press to report on and photograph events in pub-
lie places, see, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 998 (2d Cir. 1973) (a photographer's ability to
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Moreover, the legal system does not normally recognize or protect
an individual privacy interest in avoiding public exposure of the fact or
nature of one's participation in a trial. That is not to say that privacy is
a legally insignificant interest. There are situations, however, in which
privacy interests must yield to countervailing rights. The Supreme
Court has suggested that citizens must pay the price of a considerable
vulnerability to public scrutiny in exchange for the right of free
speech. 234 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,235 for example, the
Court declared it unconstitutional to subject a newspaper to damages
for publishing the name of a rape victim when that name was obtained
from public court records. Cox Broadcasting supports the view that the
first amendment does not permit privacy interests to infringe on the
press's right truthfully to report the events that transpire in a court-
room. The common law, too, has evolved a principle of immunity
from actions for invasions of privacy that protects the right of truthful
coverage of public legal proceedings. 236 Courts have applied this com-
mon law principle to both civil and criminal trials.237 Furthermore,
courts have not distinguished between parties and other trial partici-
pants.238
cover Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis in public should not be unreasonably restricted); Channel 10,
Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634 (D. Minn. 1972) (the media has a right to gather information,
including photographically, in public places); Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 CaL 2d 224, 230,
253 P.2d 441, 445 (1953) (no recovery for the publication of a photograph taken in the Los Ange-
Ies Farmers Market). Seegeneraly 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment b at
385 (1977); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 808-09 (4th ed. 1971).
234. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967): "Exposure of the self to others in varying
degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential
incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press,"
235. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 439 U.S. 963 (1979)
(the state's desire to protect privacy is an insufficient justification for preventing the press from
publishing the name of a juvenile in criminal court proceedings).
236. 420 U.S. at 493-95. Accord, Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (a de-
fendant in a nationally publicized criminal trial cannot sue for invasion of privacy because the
reporter was privileged to report about him); Edmiston v. Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (the press is privileged to report about the sexual conduct of a complaining witness in a rape
case); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948) (a party to a
custody battle has no right to privacy where his photograph was published to illustrate a newspa-
per story about the proceedings); f Randolph v. Wheeler, 223 F. Supp. 260 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (the
publication by the House Un-American Activities Committee of names of subpoenaed witnesses
did not give the plaintiffa cause of action for invasion of privacy); Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Or. 61, 74
P.2d 1127 (1938) (a radio station was not liable for defamation for broadcasting libellous state-
ments by a defense counsel about a witness in a murder trial). See also 3 RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 611, comment d at 299 (1977); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 118, at 830-33 (4th
ed. 1971).
237. Compare Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946) (the invasion of privacy
claimed by a defendant in a notorious criminal trial) with Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn. 1948) (the invasion of privacy claimed by a party to a divorce and
custody proceeding).
238. Compare Edmiston v. Time, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (a claim of invasion of
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Thus, individuals appearing in public court proceedings ordinarily
have no right of privacy that screens them from public knowledge. Oc-
casionally an entire proceeding or part of one may be held in camera to
protect some class of individuals-juveniles accused of crimes, for ex-
ample-that the court or the legislature deems especially vulnerable to
public exposure.2 39 These exceptions, however, are rare and are nor-
mally made after the legislature determines that secrecy better serves
not only that individual's interests, but the public interest as well.
Bans on recording equipment at trials open to the public cannot be
supported on the same grounds that justify a total closing of judicial
proceedings. By opening the courtroom to the public, the courts have
made the judgment that the interest of defendants in publicity and the
right of citizens to observe and discuss the operations of the judicial
system outweigh any countervailing interests of participants in se-
crecy.240 The decision to bar cameras, microphones, and tape recorders
can thus best be described as a compromise that does not prevent the
public exposure of litigants and others, but merely limits the nature of
that publicity.
Framed in this way, the difficulty becomes immediately apparent.
Bans on cameras and recorders discriminate against the photographic
and electronic media's ability to gather news effectively; the bans aim
at the partial protection of trial participants' privacy interests. The pri-
vacy interest, however, has been regularly sacrificed to free speech and
to the public interest in open trials. Absolute prohibitions against tech-
nological access to protect privacy are therefore probably unconstitu-
tional.24'
E. Content-Based Objections to Cameras in the Courts.
Despite exceptions like obscenity, 242 libel,243 and fighting words,244
privacy by a witness in a criminal trial) with Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp.
957 (D. Minn. 1948) (a claim of invasion of privacy by a party to a civil proceeding).
239. See note 229 supra. See also N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968).
240. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
241. One recent federal case dealt with a prisoner's privacy rights. A tape recording of the
defendant banging on his cell door and shouting was broadcast, and the defendant complained of
an invasion of privacy. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that when no claim of
invasion of privacy would otherwise exist, the taping of defendant's remark did not give rise to a
cause of action. Holman v. Central Ark. Broadcasting Co., 610 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1979).
242. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
243. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
244. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (later subsumed by the clear and
present danger test, see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
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a basic tenent of first amendment theory is that speech cannot be regu-
lated according to its content or because it is deemed to be socially
undesirable.245 Judges cannot shape speech to conform with their no-
tions of its merit;246 good taste is not the sine qua non of protected
speech.247 Furthermore, the first amendment gives no preference to
speech that informs over speech that "merely" entertains. 248 The Con-
stitution leaves choices about what to say to communicators. Although
eroded by special access and fairness requirements for broadcasting, 249
the principle that content-based restraints on speech are invalid re-
mains at the core of first amendment jurisprudence.
It is difficult to find this basic tenet of first amendment law in the
language with which commentators and judges have justified bans on
television in the courts, because so much of what they say is couched in
terms of disapproval of television, its content, and its style of presenting
information. The American Bar Association's earlier version of Canon
3A(7), Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, explicitly stated that
one reason to keep radio and television out of the courts is to avoid the
risk that those media might create "misconceptions" about the courts in
the minds of the pubic.2 50 Chief Justice Warren, concurring in Estes,
explained the Court's ruling partly on the grounds that, were trials rou-
tinely televised, the public might "equate the trial process with the
forms of entertainment regularly seen on television and with the com-
245. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that the government has no power to
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,95 (1972). Butsee Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,261 (1952) (crimi-
nal libel statute upheld).
246. A sampling of United States Supreme Court cases from the past two decades, including
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), as well as more recent cases like Smith v.
Daily Mail Publishing Co., 439 U.S. 963 (1979), suggests that the Court will be unwilling to pun-
ish or proscribe speech even when claimants make assertions of harm that have long been recog-
nized as deserving of legal remedy.
247. For example, the Court in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), over-
turned a ban on all nudity on drive-in theater screens despite the fact that the images could be
seen from surrounding public streets.
248. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
249. See notes 7-16 supra and accompanying text.
250. 62 A.B.A. REP. 14 (1937); amended to add the phrase "or telecasting," 77 A.B.A. REP.
429, 607 (1952). The text of Canon 35 as amended, stated that
[p]roceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum. The taking
of photographs in the court room, during sessions of the court or recesses between ses-
sions, and the broadcasting or telecasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract
from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create misconcep-
tions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
Id. (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 1980:641
OVERCOMING FUTURE SHOCK
mercial objectives of the television industry." 25' The Chief Justice ex-
pressed concern that scenes from trials mightbe aired side-by-side with
advertisements for "soft drinks, soup, eyedrops and seatcovers. ' '252 In
so stating he chose to ignore that newspapers also carry advertising,
and that they are likely to report Supreme Court opinions side-by-side
with advertisements for lingerie or supermarket specials.
The Court is not alone in justifying the exclusion of cameras be-
cause of a distaste for the content and "bad tendencies" of television
coverage. The American Bar Association's Special Committee on Tele-
vising and Broadcasting Legislative and Judicial Proceedings expressed
fears that television reports of sensational trials might have an "injuri-
ous effect on public morals. ' 253 Others have worried that television
news directors would distort coverage by showing only limited parts of
a proceeding. 254 When press advocates responded that all forms of re-
porting edit, and therefore distort, the ABA's reaction was simple: that
print journalists distort coverage is no reason to make things worse by
giving television and radio journalists the opportunity to do so as
well.255 Some of the arguments suggest that technological access
should be controlled because television communicates more effectively,
or to a larger audience, than do newspapers and.books. 256
251. 381 U.S. 532, 571 (1965).
252. Id.
253. 77 A.B.A. REP. 610 (1952):
The experience thus far with radio broadcasting and motion pictures of trials has shown
that only the most sordid crimes are likely to be televised. In addition, the undue public-
ity from the telecasting of criminals may pander to the desire of abnormal criminal
minds for mock heroics and resulting fame. To sensationalize such trials by television
can have but an injurious effect on public morals.
254. 77 A.B.A. REP. 609 (1952); Free Press and Fair Trial Hearings Before Subcomm. on
Human Rights and Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 400 (1965) (statement of Justice Abraham N. Geller); U.S. NEWs
& WORLD REP., Apr. 17, 1978, at 51 (interview with attorney John Sutro of California); cf. Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 547-48, 574 (prospective jurors, if called in a retrial, would have seen only the
state's view of the case against Estes).
255. 77 A.B.A. REP. 609 (1952) (Report of Special Committee on Televising and Broadcasting
Legislative and Judicial Proceedings): "Your committee is well aware that newspaper reports may
also by their necessary brevity give a distorted impression of the facts, but this regrettable circum-
stances affords no justification for further distortion incident to the use of television and broad-
casting."
256. The various opinions in Estes are replete with references to the power of television over
its audience. For instance, Chief Justice Warren, concurring, stated that
[b]roadcasting in the courtroom would give the television industry an awesome power to
condition the public mind either for or against an accused .... Moreover, if the case
should end in a mistrial, the showing of selected portions of the trial, or even of the
whole trial, would make it almost impossible to select an impartial jury for a second
trial.... To permit the powerful medium to use the trial process itself to influence the
opinions of vast numbers of people . . . would be entirely foreign to our system of
justice.
381 U.S. at 574. See also the discussion of prejudicial publicity, notes 164-96 supra and accompa-
nying text. For a contemporary expression of similar concern over the effects of television on the
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To state the arguments is to expose their inconsistency with first
amendment jurisprudence: they seek to discriminate against television
because of its content. The arguments are important not on their mer-
its but because they suggest the unarticulated basis for the passionate
resistance to technological access. "The Press," for some, is a subject
fraught with emotion. Mass media generally, and television particu-
larly, have often been viewed as a social "problem" of alarming dimen-
sions, as institutions which damage rather than promote the common
welfare.2 57 This distrust appears to be reflected in the process by which
the ABA drafted, and the states adopted, the original version of Canon
3A(7).
The history of the legal reaction to the communications revolution
illuminates the deeply rooted nature of this distrust. The decades of the
1920s and 1930s saw radio link together an enormous nation.258 At the
same time, the motion picture, telegraph, and telephone-all still rela-
impressions of the audience and the fairness of the proceedings, see Tribe, .rpra note 147. The
Supreme Court has firmly rejected the suggestion that, absent a clear and present danger to safety,
national security, or other compelling interests, speech can be regulated because of its effective-
ness, or its undesirable influence on an audience. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam) (reversing the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan leader under a criminal syndical-
ism statute).
257. During the 1960s all mass media were heavily criticized, but none more so than televi-
sion. Television was accused of desensitizing its viewers to a point at which they would watch a
murder without intervening to help the victim. See, e.g., H. SKOURNIA, TELEVISION AND THE
NEWS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 181 (1968). It was also accused of causing viewers to become
violent themselves, although scientific evidence was and remains questionable. M. GREEN, supra
note 192, at 308. Television was alleged to influence the events it portrayed, helping to fan civil
unrest into race riots, id., and then, by its intensive coverage, prolonging the disturbances and
raising the level of emotional tension. Dunne, TV's Riot Squad, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 11, 1965, at
27. See also H. SKOURNIA, supra, at 23. Marshall McLuhan's controversial writings on the mass
media emphasized their potential for manipulating the states of mind of whole masses of people:
We are certainly coming within conceivable range of a world automatically con-
trolled to the point where we could say, "Six hours less radio in Indonesia next week or
there will be a great falling off of literary attention." Or, "We can program twenty more
hours of TV in South Africa next week to cool down the tribal temperature raised by
radio last week.["] Whole cultures could now be programmed to keep their emotional
climate stable in the same way we have begun to know something about maintaining
equilibrium in the commercial economics of the world.
M. McLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN 28 (1964). The concern over
television is, however, not unlike that generated by other, earlier media; G. COMSTOCK ET AL.
supra note 186, at 485: "Social and behavioral science did not invent anxiety over the impact of
the mass media. It has existed since the first newspapers and popular periodicals. Comic books,
pulp fiction, and movies have all been targets of attack."
258. Guglielmo Marconi transmitted the first radio signals in 1895. Commercial use of the
radio began in a limited way in 1919. By 1925, the use of the air waves had grown so rapidly that
interference among stations became a serious problem. Federal legislation to control the chaos on
the airwaves was passed in 1927. D. GINSBURG, REGULATION OF BROADCASTING: LAW AND
POLICY TOWARDS RADIO, TELEVISION AND CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 9-10 (1979). Radio became
a major source of news and entertainment during the 1930s, only to lose its status to the newer
medium of television following World War II. Id. 243. See also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 193, 197-98 (1943).
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tively recent innovations--contributed to the revolution in man's abil-
ity to communicate quickly over great distances.259 When the legal
community perceived a need to control the explosion in mass commu-
nications, it focused attention on the relatively unfamiliar media of ra-
dio and still and newsreel photography.2 60
Distrust of television increased during the 1960s, a decade of accel-
erated development in modem communications. Television ceased to
be a toy and suddenly became a major disseminator of news and en-
tertainment. 26' Some feared that television might displace entirely
movies, radio, and books.2 62 The overwhelming cultural impact of tel-
evision, which brought distant events directly and realistically into
American living rooms, sometimes led to confusion between the me-
dium and its message. Many suspected television of collaborating in or
even causing the turbulent events it reported.2 63
It is probably not coincidental to the result in Estes that the
Supreme Court had already taken a position on the relationship be-
tween broadcasting and the federal judiciary. Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits photography and radio broad-
casting of criminal trials. In 1962, a resolution of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States extended the coverage of Rule 53 to bar
television from all federal courts and from the courtroom's environs. 264
In addition, one member of the Estes Court was involved directly in
another assessment of television's impact on society. Shortly before the
Supreme Court agreed to hear Estes, Chief Justice Warren chaired a
commission to investigate the assassination of President John F. Ken-
nedy.265 The Warren Commission's report covered the impact of inten-
sive press coverage on the sixth amendment rights of the accused
assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, and the influence of the press-particu-
259. See notes 100-02 supra and accompanying text.
260. See Kielbowicz, supra note 127, at 20-23. See also note 204 supra.
261. For a discussion of television as disseminator of news, see generally H. LAND Assocs.,
supra note 192; Hardin, The TVNews Explosion, SATURDAY REVIEW, Feb. 11, 1967, at 72.
262. See note 16 supra.
263. See note 257 supra.
264. FED. R. CRIM. P. 53 provides: "The taking of photographs in the court room during the
progress ofjudicial proceedings or radio broadcasting ofjudicial proceedings from the court room
shall not be permitted by the court." At its meeting in 1962, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, which is chaired by the Chief Justice, resolved to extend Rule 53 to cover telecasting, and
to bar technological access to non-criminal proceedings and to the environs of the courtroom as
well as to the court itself. [1962] JUD. CONF. ANN. REP. 9-10; Report of the Comm. on the Opera-
tion ofthe Jury System on the 'Tree Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 414-15 (1969); ABA
Special Comm. on Proposed Revision of Judicial Canon 35, Interim Report and Recommenda-
tions 95-100 (1962) (including correspondence with Chief Justice Warren on the resolutions
passed by the Judicial Conference).




larly radio and television-on the events leading to his death.266 The
shooting of Oswald by Jack Ruby presented additional prejudicial pub-
licity problems because Ruby killed Oswald before an audience of mil-
lions who were riveted to their home television screens watching the
aftermath of the President's tragic death.
Events like the killing of Oswald, coupled with television's cover-
age of other highly charged subjects such as the urban riots and the
Vietnam war, fueled a suspicion that television by its nature created
news rather than merely covered it.267 Subsequent years of experience
have dulled the edge of suspicion about the socially subversive nature
of television coverage; television has melted into American culture. As
the Estes majority conceded could happen, society has become accus-
tomed to television. 268 For that reason alone, it may now be possible to
expect the outcome in Chandler v. Florida269 to differ from that in Es-
/es, and to reevaluate the ABA Canon.
F. Are the Reasons to Limit Techological Access Persuasive?
To the extent that Estes and Canon 3A(7) reflect fears about how
television would cover trials, or concerns about the effects televised re-
porting might have on public attitudes and perceptions about the
courts, they fail to weigh properly the interests at stake. To the extent
that Estes and Canon 3A(7) attempt to control the size of the audience
that will receive information about the courts, their aim is inconsistent
with the first amendment. If anything, exposure of more people to
more information about the operations of the courts would be a clear
social benefit. Rationally considered, these bases for refusing techno-
logical access do not explain the rule more reasonably than does
266. Id. 196-242.
267. See note 257 supra. On the Vietnam war, see also M. GREEN, supra note 192, at 296:
The widespread American disenchantment with the long war in Vietnam, the swell-
ing urge for peace, almost certainly derived in part from the fact that this was the first
war since the Civil War in which the American civilian participated-by means of televi-
sion. His participation was vicarious, but his emotional involvement was excruciatingly
painful. It was the first war fought in everyone's living room.
On urban riots, see NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 201-13 (1968),
accusing the press of "overplaying" violence and of sensationalizing its riot coverage. The com-
mission apparently considered television the most significant coverage because it found that
"[tielevision is the formal news source most relied on in the ghetto." Id. 207.
268. 381 U.S. at 551-52:
It is said that the ever-advancing techniques of public communication and the ad-
justment of the public to its presence may bring about a change in the effect of telecast-
ing upon the fairness of criminal trials. But we are not dealing here with future
developments. . . . [We] must take the facts as they are presented today.
Accord, id. at 595-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
269. 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), prob.juris noted, 100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980). See
notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
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prejudice of lawyers and judges against the use of television in their
domain.
No evidence exists to support the notion that recording equipment,
properly operated, inevitably violates the constitutional rights of crimi-
nal defendants or indeed affects them differently from press coverage in
general. Trial courts have the powers necessary to prevent disturbances
in the courtroom. Problems of prejudicial publicity are not unique to
cameras and recording equipment and can be managed by the same
methods used to prevent prejudice from other sources. Individuals in-
volved in trials may experience substantial stress, but nothing suggests
that technological access would increase the tension. Trial participants
do not have enforceable privacy rights against the press and public. In
any case, discriminatory bans on cameras and recorders do not insulate
trial participants from public and press scrutiny, but do impair substan-
tial first amendment interests.
It is appropriate for courts to guard the interests of defendants
zealously. But the courts should also be sensitive to the possibility that
prejudice has inadvertently tipped the rulemaking process toward an
unsupportable denial of technological access. Judges and lawyers are
accustomed to being removed from intense public scrutiny;270 in devis-
ing court rules and procedures like those at issue here, the legal profes-
sion may build into them its preference for maintaining that distance.
Because the same court frequently both makes and reviews its own
rules, 271 it is easy for traditional preferences to survive challenges. To
overcome the bias inherent in their own rules, courts must make
scrupulous efforts to be neutral.27 2 The current concern among the
state courts reviewing their positions on technological access may por-
tend the beginning of greater neutrality in this area of press and court
relations.
III. PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON TECHNOLOGICAL ACCESS
Although courts should not flatly ban technological access, they
are not shorn of all powers to regulate that access. The courts may
exercise their discretion to impose limitations when necessary to pre-
270. Weinstein & Zimmerman, supra note 109.
271. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1964) (reviewing the statutory and constitu-
tional validity of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1)); Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438
(1946) (reviewing the validity of FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f)).
272. The difficulty faced by courts reviewing their own rules is discussed in Weinstein, Reform
ofFederal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 905, 934-38 (1976). For expressions
of concern about this issue by members of the United States Supreme Court, see 383 U.S. 1030,
1032 (1966) (amendments to FED. R. Civ. P.) (Black, J., dissenting); 374 U.S. 865, 865-66 (1963)
(amendments to FED. R. Civ. P.) (statement of Black and Douglas, JJ.).
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vent a clear danger to the right of fair trial, or when proper administra-
tion of the court justifies narrowly tailored restrictions on the time,
place, and manner of technological access. Regulations to prevent un-
fairness will be needed almost exclusively at the trial level; appellate
courts will rarely if ever face circumstances which justify more than
time, place, and manner restrictions on the operations of news-
gatherers.
A. Technical Guidelines for the Use of Recording Equoment in the
Courts.
The presence of cameras in the courts makes necessary rules to
protect the court against noise, disruption, and confusion. Regulation
of the number, placement, and noise level of cameras is necessary to
enable the court to carry on its work free from interruption. 273 The
accommodation of the due process rights of parties in civil and crimi-
nal proceedings also justifies these regulations.
While the press has asserted that it can voluntarily control the
noise and distraction that accompany technological access, the facts in
Estes suggest that court-made rules are a preferable way to avoid inad-
vertent interference with the trial,274 including accidental infringement
of lawyer-client confidentiality. 275 Reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations can establish the circumstances that require pooling be-
tween broadcasters, the sorts of equipment they may use, and the rules
regarding placement of equipment in the courtroom.
The states vary markedly in how they approach the regulation of
technological access. Florida, for example, formulated detailed state-
wide "standards of conduct and technology. '276 After tests of still cam-
eras before judges and press representatives, Florida prohibited models
273. See text accompanying notes 149-52 supra.
274. For example, at the pretrial hearing in Estes photographers wandered behind the bench
to take pictures of the judge, 381 U.S. at 553 (Warren, C.J., concurring); a dozen cameramen were
present with their equipment, id. at 552-53 (Warren, C.J., concurring); and the placement of mi-
crophones created a risk that private bench conferences and consultations between defendant and
counsel would be overheard. Id. at 536 (Warren, C.J., concurring). While the press may be able
to avoid that kind of confusion by self-regulation on a case-by-case basis, the establishment of
clear rules arrived at by a collaboration of press and court and applicable to all trials would help
prevent errors of judgment and give all participants advance notice of what to expect.
275. The risk of interference with the lawyer-client confidentiality was present, at least at the
pretrial stage, in Estes. Id. at 536. In Hudson v. State, 108 Ga. App. 192, 132 S.E.2d 508 (1963), a
conviction was reversed because the placement of a radio microphone made it impossible for
defendant to confer with counsel throughout the trial.
276. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 347 So. 2d 404, 404 (Fla. 1977). The standards
were adopted as permanent when Florida formally revised its Canon 3A(7) in 1979. In re Post-
Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 782, 783-84 app. (Fla. 1979).
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noisy enough to disturb participants with their clicks and whirs, regu-
lated details of placement of cameras and microphones, and adopted
rules limiting the use of artificial lighting.277 Alabama, in contrast, left
to each judicial circuit the task of coming up with reasonable regula-
tions. The plan each circuit adopts is then subject to approval by the
state supreme court.278
However approached, the prior promulgation of rules of general
applicability reduces the risk of interference with trial procedures.
Prior promulgation of the rules saves the trial court from the need to
make repeated rulings during the course of the trial-a problem which
troubled the Supreme Court about the trial in Estes.279 In addition,
pre-existing rules, which can be challenged when promulgated, protect
the press; if courts make rules ad hoc at each trial, the press's only
redress for unwarranted infringements would be an appeal-a remedy
too late to permit effective coverage of the relevant trial. Generally
applicable rules protect trial participants from insufficient restraints
born of inexperience, and simultaneously guard the press from exces-
sive restraints.
The rules should be formulated with substantial press participa-
tion, giving the press a chance to voice objections before the rules
become final. One protection that should be built into any rulemaking
process on this issue is a provision for periodic review of the guidelines,
including review at the behest of the press. This safeguard avoids lock-
ing the courts and press into outmoded restrictions, and provides a
means for correction of problems that develop when the rules are put
into practice. Regulations that require the press and public to rely on
devices such as pooling and to use only approved equipment restrict
their freedom to gather news. As long as these rules are the least re-
strictive means to avoid physical interference with the trial, they are not
unreasonable regulations and do not significantly injure first amend-
ment values.
B. Excessive Regulation that States Should Avoid.
A court's inherent power to regulate the conduct of trials does not
include the authority to impose restrictions on the news-gatherer's use
of material once it has been obtained. One commentator has suggested
that the courts should condition technological access on a press agree-
ment to cover trials regularly-not just when the broadcasters deem
277. See authorities cited in note 276 supra.
278. Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3A(7A)(a) (effective Feb. 1, 1976), printed in
ALA. CODE. tit. 23, at 542 (Michie 1975).
279. 381 U.S. at 551.
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cases interesting28 0-and on a promise to "balance" coverage to treat
the defendant and plaintiff or prosecution even-handedly. 28t Some
cases implicitly support these extreme notions. A concurring opinion
in Estes, for example, suggests that a legitimate objection to television
coverage is that tapes of the trial may be edited, or "commercialized"
by association with advertisements. 282 While the courts that recently
have experimented with technological access have not imposed regula-
tions on editorial discretion, they have, nevertheless, imposed other re-
strictions that are equally inconsistent with free speech. One rule, for
example, conditioned the right to televise a trial upon an agreement
that the videotape could not be used until all appeals in the case had
been exhausted. 283 This restriction on the televising of trials might be
acceptable if the courts were merely extending to the media a privilege
which they could withdraw at will; it is unacceptable, however, when
attached to a right of constitutional dimensions. Because the print
press may report on the trial contemporaneously, and because broad-
casters can discuss the case on the air as it proceeds, the theory pro-
posed by this Article implies that the press has a right to print pictures
and show videotaped scenes from the trial at its discretion. The gag
order, a prior restraint, is no longer acceptable for limiting the freedom
of the press to report its observations.28 4 No reason exists to justify the
280. See H. SKOURNIA, supra note 257, at 184-85. Skournia would also require stations to use
reporters with legal training, to ban commercial sponsorship of court proceedings, and to agree, in
return for a right to broadcast "live," that the entire trial will be aired. Id.
281. Id. 186.
282. 381 U.S. at 571 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
283. This limitation is imposed by the ABA's model Canon of Judicial Ethics 3A(7) on the
recordation of trials for educational purposes, see note 127 supra, which is still in effect in about
half the states. It was also imposed by the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada when it
agreed to a preliminary test of broadcasting trials. Goldman & Larson, News Camera in the Court-
room During State v. Solorzano: End to the Estes Mandate?, 10 Sw. NEv. L. REv. 2001, 2034
(1978). In the Nevada case, however, the limitation was imposed in part to avoid a violation of a
state law that prohibited live broadcasts. The statute said nothing about videotapes shown after
the trial. (The statute has since been amended to permit all broadcasting. 1979 Nev. Stats., As-
sembly Bill No. 571.) While these restrictions are questionable under American law, British law
does permit orders barring press reports until completion of all proceedings by all media. The
court's power is said, however, rarely to be invoked in this way. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, MEDIA
COVERAGE OF CRIMINAL TRIALS IN AUSTRALIA, CANADA, AND GREAT BRITAIN at Gt. Brit. 4
(1975). A slightly different restriction was built into Wisconsin's new rule. That state prohibits
use of film, videotape, photographic, or audio reproductions for "unrelated advertising purposes."
Wisconsin Rules Governing Electronic Media and Still Photography Coverage of Judicial Pro-
ceedings, rule 12 (effective July 1, 1979), printed in 70 Wisc. 2d xix (1979). The provision pro-
voked a dissent, reflecting concern about its constitutionality, from two members of the state
supreme court. In re Code of Judicial Ethics, Wis., (filed June 21, 1979) (Abrahamson and Heffer-
nan, JJ., dissenting in part).
284. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). Nebraska Press does not explicitly
preclude all uses of gag orders, but suggests that they could be used, if at all, only to prevent the
most serious and immediate threat of harm to a fair trial.
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use of this disfavored device to limit the choice of means by which
information may be disseminated.
The vast majority of jurisdictions that permit technological access
attach conditions upon the access, such as the requirement of prior ap-
proval by one or more participants in the action.2 85 Many states re-
quire both the judge and the criminal defendant or civil litigants to
consent-often in writing-before electronic or photographic coverage
will be permitted.2 86 Louisiana, in its pilot project, also required the
consent of the district attorney and victim in a criminal action. 287 The
rules that require a defendant's prior consent in criminal cases have
been drafted at least in part to accommodate Estes, which involved a
nonconsenting defendant.
The argument for giving a criminal defendant the power to veto
the presence of cameras at his trial is that it would accord maximum
protection to his interest in a fair proceeding. As the exercise of this
veto would limit a first amendment right, however, it can be justified
only if in the average case photography and broadcasting are prejudi-
cial. As Part II of this Article argues, there is no empirical support for
that proposition. The better rule, therefore, would be to require a de-
fendant who objects to cameras to show that they would pose more
than a speculative and insubstantial risk to due process in his case.2 88
Witnesses, parties, and jurors should not have an absolute veto either.
As long as the trial is otherwise open,289 privacy concerns do not suffice
to exclude cameras from the trial.290
285. See, e.g., Alabama Canon of Judicial Ethics 3A(7A)(b), 3A(7A)(c) (effective Feb. 1,
1976), printed in ALA. CODE tit 23, at 542; Alaska Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7)(c)(ii)
(effective Nov. 1, 1979), In re Canon 3A(7), 5 Media L. Rep. 2494 (Alaska 1979); Georgia Code of
Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(8) (amended May 12, 1977), printed in 238 Ga. 855 (1977); Ohio
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (effective June 1, 1979),printedin 58 Ohio St. xxxi (1979);
Oklahoma Code of Judicial Conduct, Revised Canon 3A(7) (effective Jan. 1, 1979), printed in
OKLA. STATS. ANN. Ch. 1, app. 4 (West Supp. 1979); Tennessee Supreme Court Order, In re. Rule
43, Canon 3A(7)-Code of Judicial Conduct (amended Feb. 22, 1979), printed in TENN. CODE
ANN. vol. 5a (Supp. 1979); Washington Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3A(7) (effective Sept.
20, 1976), printed in 87 Wash. 1119 (1976).
286. Such states include Alabama, Alaska, and Colorado (judge and criminal defendants
only); Georgia (all parties); and Louisiana (all parties, including the district attorneys and victims
of the crimes), see note 287 infra.
287. Louisiana Supreme Court Order Concerning Television and Court Rules and Regula-
tions for Division B of the Ninth Judicial District Court for Rapides Parish (effective Feb. 23,
1978).
288. For an example of the circumstances in which a defendant might succeed in excluding
cameras, see text accompanying notes 297-98 infra.
289. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
290. As with defendants, special circumstances may require that the court prevent technologi-
cal access to protect witnesses and jurors. But such protection should be granted only upon a clear
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A requirement that individuals or representatives of the press no-
tify the court prior to trial that some recording device will be used
would not offend the right of technological access. Advance notice
would permit courts to ensure that the equipment used, as well as the
numbers of individuals required to operate it, would not physically in-
terfere with the conduct of the trial. Advance notice would also permit
the parties to the action to object and to present special problems to the
court for resolution in advance of the actual trial.29'
One final area to consider is whether the courts may limit the right
of technological access to members of the institutional press. The
Supreme Court has thus far declined to identify any situation in which
the Constitution treats the institutional press differently from individ-
ual citizens.292 If the press has a right under the Constitution to use
cameras or recorders in court, the general public enjoys a correspond-
ing right. In actuality, this expansive view of the rights of the public
should not create insurmountable problems for the courts. Courts are
not asked, or expected, to supply the equipment or the technical per-
sonnel needed to televise or broadcast proceedings; the news-gatherer
bears the cost and responsibility of supplying appropriate equipment.
Thus, a high school civics class that wants to record a trial for school
use ought to be able to do so if the board of education or the parents
can supply the necessary tools. If both individuals and the organized
press want to take pictures of or record a particular trial, rules on pool-
ing could prevent a swarm of photographers and technicians from
overwhelming the court; the individuals and the press may share the
cost of producing the required coverage. Few individuals are likely to
have the incentive or the wherewithal to participate, but when they do,
Supreme Court cases and sound policy both suggest that they should
not be excluded.
C. Limitations on Technological Access Because of a Compelling
State Interest.
The argument that reporters and the public should have a pre-
sumptive right to use cameras and recording equipment in court does
showing of need, and not merely because the individual requests it. See notes 293-98 11/ra and
accompanying text.
291. Advance notice should probably not be required for the use of tape recorders, because
these devices are not disruptive and are unlikely to create any other significant problems for any-
one involved in a trial.
292. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978). See Blanchard, The Institutional Press
and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 225.
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not mean that a judge can never exclude these devices. Occasionally it
may be necessary to ban cameras during the appearance of particular
witnesses or during the trial of certain defendants. But in order to do
so some unique attribute of the equipment must cause a serious prob-
lem that more traditional forms of reporting do not.2 93 For example,
the court may need to protect the safety of a witness-such as an indi-
vidual who has received a new identity under the federal witness pro-
tection program.2 94 In certain cases, photographing witnesses would
expose them to risks that would not be created if only their testimony
were published.295 Those who know a witness by a new identity and
who would not recognize him from reports using his former name
might identify him from photographs or television newscasts. Simi-
larly, undercover police agents involved in investigations may be recog-
nized by a suspect who sees pictures of agents taken during a trial.2 96
These interests may suffice to deny all technological access during the
time these witnesses are in the courtroom.
This exception, however, should not be applied unless it will actu-
ally accomplish its purpose. In most instances, witnesses subject to the
risk of recognition will not be sufficiently protected simply by banning
television or still photography; publication of their names or other
identifying facts, and the possibility of spectator recognition either in-
side or outside the courthouse, will still remain as substantial threats.
In these cases, the courts would continue their current practice of clos-
ing hearings while such witnesses are under examination.
A defendant's or witness's strenuous objections to the presence of
cameras or electronic media raises a more difficult question: can a de-
fendant's or a witness's subjective aversion to cameras require their ex-
clusion? For example, a major exculpatory witness in a criminal case
might refuse to testify before cameras. While criminal contempt is
available, the choice of the witness to remain silent may severely
293. Whenever a compelling reason is asserted to justify banning cameras or other devices, the
court should not rule on the request until the press and public receive notice and are offered an
opportunity to be heard.
294. Protected Facilities for Housing Government Witnesses Act of 1970 §§ 501-504, 18
U.S.C. preceding § 3481 (1976).
295. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370 So. 2d 764, 778-79 (Fla. 1979) gives a de-
tailed discussion of the kinds of problems which may require limited restrictions on technological
access after a balancing of the conflicting interests at stake. See also Palm Beach Newspapers v.
Florida, 378 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (witness safety asserted as a reason to bar
photography, sketching, and television from court).
296. Cf. New York v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409, 418 N.Y.S.2d 359, 391 N.E.2d 1335 (recognizing
the court's power to protect undercover police agents, but finding that the power was improperly
exercised in this case), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979).
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prejudice the defendant's sixth amendment rights. When the ability to
proceed with a fair trial is thrown into doubt, it may be preferable to
exclude recording equipment from that segment of the trial. Similarly,
a defendant who claims he will be too distressed by the presence of
cameras to participate in his own defense may have a valid argument
for keeping them out of his trial.
A variant of this problem occurred in Florida. A defendant in a
grand larceny case complained that in the light of her recent psychotic
depression, television cameras in court would so disturb her that she
would be incompetent to stand trial.297 In this case, television itself
could not be said, objectively, to create any unusual risk to the defend-
ant; at issue was the camera's effect on her subjective perceptions. The
Florida District Court of Appeals concluded that the incompetency
claim warranted an evidentiary hearing.298 Though courts must
respond flexibly to the unusual case in order to safeguard due process
rights, too many exceptions like these could quickly devour the pro-
posed right of technological access.
Courts should be particularly wary of extending the "subjective
aversion" exception to exclude cameras from otherwise public trials for
the purpose of protecting the complaining witness in a sex crime
case.299 Courts have employed various techniques in the past to defend
these witnesses: in some states, statutes or the courts' inherent powers
permit exclusion of all the press and public from particularly sensitive
cases or testimony. The rationale behind this rule is that the require-
ment of testifying publicly will inhibit or psychologically scar certain
witnesses.300
Closing the court is not an ideal way to protect witnesses in sexual
assault cases. Exclusion is an extreme response that interferes with the
297. Green v. State, 377 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
298. Id. at 201.
299. New Jersey's experimental guidelines for broadcasting trials specifically exclude juvenile
court cases, rape cases, child custody and divorce proceedings, and trials involving trade secrets.
New Jersey Supreme Court Order (Mar. 15, 1979). Florida, which has one of the broadest rules,
establishing a presumption in favor of technological access, nevertheless recognizes the need to
protect children in custody battles, sexual battery victims, and others in comparable situations
from exposure to cameras and recording equipment. In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Fla., Inc., 370
So. 2d 764, 779 (Fla. 1979). But cf. New-Press Publishing Co. v. Shearer, 5 Media L. Rep. 1272
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (setting aside an order barring a reporter from court during the testi-
mony of a juvenile in a sex-crime trial).
300. See, e.g., N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968); New York v. Jones, 47 N.Y.2d 409,
418 N.Y.S.2d 359, 391 N.E.2d 1335, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979) (discussing the trial court's
discretion to exclude the public from the testimony of a particular witnesses). See generally Note,
Exclusion of Publicfrom a Proceeding Merely Upon Request is in Excess of Courtir Power, 30 U.
MIAMI L. Rev. 1075 (1976) (discussing the limits ofjudicial discretion in barring the public and
press from a marriage proceeding). See also note 229 supra.
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public's interest in the open administration of justice;30' it also may run
counter to the defendant's interest in a public trial.30 2 Certainly, if the
recognition of a right of technological access encourages judges to close
courtrooms more frequently, either during the testimony of the rape
victim or for the whole trial, it will foster neither public justice nor the
free exchange of ideas.
The focus on a choice between barring media technology or clos-
ing the courtroom clouds the issue, because neither device really ad-
dresses the major problems such witnesses face. Complainants in
sexual assault cases traditionally have needed protection from publicity
largely because they risked, when they took the stand, impeachment
through an often brutal examination of their prior sexual histories.
Modem rules of evidence that limit the scope and nature of the permis-
sible inquiry respond directly to humiliation of witnesses; rules that
regulate the composition of the audience do not.30 3 Furthermore, rape
shield laws cure without incurring a cost to the interest in public trials.
In those jurisdictions that routinely try sexual assault cases in open
court, even with the protection of strict evidentiary rules the witness
will probably continue to find that the compulsion to testify publicly to
the events of the assault will engender some additional psychic pain.
That does not mean she can exclude the public, because participants in
trials do not have a clear legal claim to be free from public scrutiny.
Privacy claims should not, therefore, suffice to bar the electronic and
photographic press unless the state can demonstrate some difference in
harm, uniquely attributable to the presence of cameras or microphones,
that justifies the exclusion of cameras and recorders alone. Appearing
before an audience composed of jurors, spectators, print reporters,
court artists, and the defendant is stressful in itself; the witness's
anguish is unlikely to be fundamentally changed by the expanded
range of unseen spectators. Unless the electronic and photographic
press can be shown to create problems that are not caused by other
reporters, discriminatory treatment cannot be justified.
301. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2823-25 (1980); Lexington Her-
ald Leader v. Tackett, 49 U.S.L.W. 2041 (Ky. June 24, 1980); New York v. Jones, 47 N.Y. 2d 409,
418 N.Y.S. 2d 359, 391 N.E. 2d 1335, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979); State ex rel. Oregonian
Publishing Co. v. Deiz, 613 P.2d 23 (Or. 1980).
302. The defendant's right to a public trial is set out in U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
303. A typical evidentiary rule limiting the inquiry which may be made into the sexual behav-
ior of an alleged victim of rape or sexual assault is FED. R. EvID. 412, which was approved by
Congress in 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-540, § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A.). See
also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney Supp. 1979) for a similar provision. At the time
the federal rule was approved, some 30 states had revised their rules to protect sexual battery





This Article proposes a modest alteration in the existing view of
the first amendment. News-gathering by the technological methods ap-
propriate to each medium of communication should be recognized as
entitled to constitutional protection. This expansion in the scope of the
first amendment is necessary to ensure that news media may convey
information without interference for capricious or insubstantial rea-
sons.
When the technical methods of information gathering are re-
stricted, the content of the communication is inevitably and impor-
tantly affected. In a jurisprudence that attaches special importance to
news-gathering, communication about public officials, and exposure of
the operations of government, restrictions on technological access to
the events and actors are especially serious limitations on the free ex-
change of ideas. Nevertheless, such restrictions have been imposed
routinely with only the barest examination of the resulting impairment
of the freedom of speech and press, and with scarcely more thought to
the reality-much less the weight-of the interests that are thereby pre-
ferred.
A constitutional right of technological access would require that
the government impose no more restrictions on the means by which its
performance is reported than are strictly necessary to accommodate the
countervailing constitutional requirements of orderly process. Recog-
nition of this right, and of its place in the courtroom, will promote a
greater public understanding of the work of the judiciary without im-
posing any measurable costs. Despite the controversy that has sur-
rounded technological access for over half a century, an examination of
the issue suggests that a recommendation for constitutional protection
of that aspect of news-gathering is actually a very modest proposal.
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